Now or Never: The Urgent Need for Action Against Unfair Coverage Denials for Quality Health Care by Worthy, Stacey L et al.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 
Volume 48 
Issue 4 Summer 2017 Article 8 
2017 
Now or Never: The Urgent Need for Action Against Unfair 
Coverage Denials for Quality Health Care 
Stacey L. Worthy 
Daniel C. McClughen 
Shruti Kulkarni 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stacey L. Worthy, , Daniel C. McClughen, & Shruti Kulkarni, Now or Never: The Urgent Need for Action 
Against Unfair Coverage Denials for Quality Health Care, 48 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1041 (). 
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol48/iss4/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please 
contact law-library@luc.edu. 
11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2017 11:10 AM 
 
1041 
Now or Never: The Urgent Need for Action Against 
Unfair Coverage Denials for Quality Health Care 
Stacey L. Worthy, Daniel C. McClughen, & Shruti Kulkarni* 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1042 
I.  COMMON BENEFIT UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ... 1044 
A.  Step Therapy .............................................................. 1044 
1.  The ACA’s Nondiscrimination Provision ........... 1045 
2. The Medicaid Act: Reasonable Promptness 
Provision ............................................................. 1047 
3.  State Claim Based on the Interference with the 
Physician-Patient Relationship ........................... 1048 
B.  Adverse Tiering .......................................................... 1051 
1.  The ACA’s Nondiscrimination and Preexisting 
Condition Provisions........................................... 1053 
2.  The Federal Rehabilitation Act ........................... 1055 
3.  State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade 
Practices .............................................................. 1057 
C.  Nonmedical Switching ............................................... 1059 
1.  State Breach of Contract Claim ........................... 1060 
2.  State Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Claim ................................................................... 1061 
3.  State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade 
Practices .............................................................. 1062 
D.  Prior Authorization ................................................... 1064 
1.  The Medicaid Act’s Payment for Covered Outpatient 
Drugs Provision .................................................. 1066 
2.  The Medicaid Act’s Reasonable Promptness 
Provision ............................................................. 1068 
3.  The Medicare Act’s Part D Formulary 
Requirements ...................................................... 1070 
4.  State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade 
 
* Stacey L. Worthy is the Executive Director of the Alliance for the Adoption of Innovations in 
Medicine (“Aimed Alliance”) and a partner at DCBA Law & Policy.  Daniel C. McClughen and 
Shruti R. Kulkarni are associate attorneys at DCBA Law & Policy. 
11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2017  11:10 AM 
1042 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  48 
Practices .............................................................. 1071 
5.  State Common Law Claim for Insurance Bad 
Faith .................................................................... 1073 
E.  Network Adequacy ..................................................... 1076 
1.  Federal Claim Based on the ACA’s Network 
Adequacy Standards ........................................... 1076 
2.  CMS’ Transparency Rule .................................... 1077 
3.  State Claim Based on Network Adequacy Laws . 1078 
4.  State Breach of Contract Claim ........................... 1079 
5.  State Claim Pursuant to Unfair and Deceptive Trade 
Practice Laws ...................................................... 1080 
F.  Clinical Pathways Programs ..................................... 1082 
1.  State Medical Practice Acts ................................. 1083 
2.  State Commercial Bribery Statutes ..................... 1084 
3.  State Ethics .......................................................... 1086 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................ 1088 
A.  Empowering Consumers to Take Action .................... 1089 
B.  Passing State Consumer Protection Legislation........ 1091 
1.  Step Therapy........................................................ 1091 
2.  Adverse Tiering ................................................... 1092 
3.  Nonmedical Switching ........................................ 1093 
4.  Prior Authorizations ............................................ 1094 
5.  Network Adequacy .............................................. 1095 
6.  Clinical Pathways ................................................ 1095 
C.  Strong Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws .. 1096 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 1097 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, James Skelcy was diagnosed with dermatomyositis, a 
connective tissue disease, and interstitial lung disease.1  After receiving 
several ineffective medications, Mr. Skelcy’s rheumatologist prescribed 
him two doses of rituximab (i.e., a drug used to treat autoimmune diseases 
and certain types of cancer), allowing him to enter and maintain remission 
for almost a full year.2  In 2010, when his symptoms returned, his insurer 
refused to cover the medication, ignoring his rheumatologist’s urgent 
 
1. Skelcy v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 620 F. App’x 136, 138 (3d Cir. 2015). 
2. Id. 
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request for the medication.3  After a thirty-two-day delay in treatment due 
to back-and forth-communications with the insurer, Mr. Skelcy died of 
chronic dermatomyositis, interstitial pulmonary fibrosis, endomyocardial 
fibrosis, and cardiac arrhythmia—conditions the prescribed medication 
likely could have prevented if authorized in time.4 
In 2011, Shima Andre was diagnosed with hepatitis C, a chronic liver 
disease.5  Her physician prescribed her a medication that cost $99,000 
without insurance coverage but cured the deadly virus in most individuals 
with hepatitis C.6  Ms. Andre’s insurer refused to cover the medication, 
deeming it “not medically necessary.”7  The insurer explained that it 
would only cover the medication for individuals who had evidence of 
“advanced liver damage,” meaning Ms. Andre’s disease would have to 
progress to the point in which she needed a liver transplant before she 
could access the cure.8 
Mr. Skelcy’s and Ms. Andre’s stories are not uncommon.  In fact, a 
2011 study revealed that the United States ranked last among sixteen 
developed nations for preventing deaths from treatable conditions—
including certain forms of cancer, diabetes, and stroke—through timely 
access to effective health care.9 
With the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) in 2010, millions of Americans gained access to health care.10  
Yet, many individuals with conditions that have been historically more 
expensive to treat, such as cancer, HIV, and hepatitis C, still find 
themselves subject to overly restrictive benefit utilization management 
practices that forbid access to medically necessary, life-sustaining 
treatments.11  Moreover, with the new administration calling for the 
 
3. Id.  “Insurer,” as used in this Article, refers to private health insurers, health plans, fiduciaries, 
and administrators. 
4. Id. at 139. 
5. Stuart Pfeifer, Woman Sues Anthem Blue Cross for Refusing to Cover Hepatitis C Drug, L.A. 
TIMES (May 18, 2015, 10:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-anthem-blue-cross-
harvoni-lawsuit-20150518-story.html. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. COMMONWEALTH FUND COMM’N ON A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYS., WHY NOT THE 
BEST?: RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL SCORECARD ON U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 9 
(Oct. 2011), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-
report/2011/oct/1500_wntb_natl_scorecard_2011_web_v2.pdf. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2015). 
11. The term “benefit utilization management” as used in this Article, refers to insurers’ cost-
saving techniques that are intended to influence practitioners’ and patients’ health care decision 
making. 
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repeal of the ACA, insurers may find it easier to discriminate against 
individuals based on their health conditions. 
Insurers’ overly burdensome benefit utilization management practices 
are unethical, inefficient, and, in some instances, illegal.  They result in 
poor quality of care and take health care decisions away from 
practitioners and patients.  Therefore, consumers must be empowered to 
bring suits, and federal and state authorities must enforce laws currently 
in place to ensure that individuals with chronic, debilitating, and rare 
health conditions have timely access to coverage of quality care.  Where 
such protections are lacking, states must enact stronger laws.12  This 
Article examines several benefit utilization management practices, 
including step therapy, adverse tiering, nonmedical switching, prior 
authorization, narrow networks, and clinical pathways.  It analyzes 
relevant statutory and case law, including consumer protection laws, tort 
law, and contract law and calls for greater enforcement.  This Article also 
provides consumers with the information necessary to bring a lawsuit or 
file a complaint, recommends state legislation addressing burdensome 
insurance practices, and encourages states to provide regulators with the 
proper authority to take enforcement actions. 
I.  COMMON BENEFIT UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Providing quality care to individuals with chronic conditions can be 
expensive.  To save on costs, insurers essentially ration out health care.  
They do this by using benefit utilization management policies to limit 
access to more expensive treatments.  Yet, insurers sometimes employ 
benefit utilization management policies in a manner that excludes large 
patient populations from accessing life-saving treatments in favor of 
treatments that are typically older and may be inferior or are known to 
produce adverse effects.  Such policies interfere with the physician-
patient relationship in a detrimental manner and may violate both state 
and federal laws.  This Part discusses some of those commonly employed 
benefit utilization management policies and the laws that the policies may 
violate. 
A.  Step Therapy 
Step therapy policies, which are also referred to as “fail first” policies, 
require individuals to try and fail on less expensive treatments, sometimes 
with adverse effects, before the insurer will cover the original, likely 
 
12. This Article does not address self-funded employer plans, which are governed by the 
Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), rather than state law. 
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more expensive, treatment prescribed to them.13  Pursuant to medical 
practice, individuals are supposed to begin with the safest and most cost-
effective treatment and then progress to riskier and costlier treatments.14  
In reality, step therapy policies can be cruel and unethical.  For instance, 
a recent study showed that 45 percent of individuals who were prescribed 
immunological agents and biologics were forced to first “step through” a 
treatment with a black-box warning (i.e., a medication with a known risk 
for a severe adverse reaction) before their insurers would cover the 
prescribed treatment.15  Step therapy policies can also significantly delay 
access to effective treatments, causing the individuals’ conditions to 
worsen while they wait.16 
1.  The ACA’s Nondiscrimination Provision 
President Obama signed the ACA into law on March 23, 2010 to 
improve the accessibility of quality health care.  As part of those efforts, 
section 1557 of the ACA (i.e., the nondiscrimination provision) expressly 
prohibits all entities principally engaged in providing or administering 
health insurance coverage, including public and private insurers and 
pharmacy benefit managers (“covered entities”), from excluding from 
participation, denying a benefit for, or discriminating against any 
individual on the basis of a health condition.17 
On May 18, 2016, the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) issued a final rule implementing the nondiscrimination 
provision, which clarified that covered entities are prohibited from 
employing “marketing practices or benefit designs”18 that discriminate 
 
13. Paul Sisson, Bill Would Quicken Access to Newer Meds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 3, 
2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/oct/03/ab374-chronic-
disease/. 
14. Gary Branning et al., Formulary Management of Branded Drugs with and Without Boxed 
Warnings Within Therapeutic Categories, 18 J. INT’L SOC’Y FOR PHARMACOECONOMICS & 
OUTCOMES RES. A100, A100 (2015). 
15. Id. at A100.  Biologics are medical products made from natural sources (e.g., human, 
animal, and microorganism) to prevent, diagnosis, or treat medical conditions.  What Is a Biological 
Product?, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194516.htm (last updated May 31, 2016). 
16. See Fox Ins. Co. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1213–14 (2013) 
(noting that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) terminated a Medicare 
contract because the defendant imposed benefit utilization management strategies, including step 
therapy, to significantly delay patient access to needed medication, thereby placing patients in 
imminent and serious risk). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2015); Callum v. CVS Health Corp., 137 F. Supp. 3d 817, 853 (D.S.C. 
2015).  The nondiscrimination provision contains a private cause of action.  Callum, 137 F. Supp. 
3d at 848. 
18. Benefit design refers to the treatments covered by a health care plan and the restrictions 
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on the basis of a health condition.19  For the purpose of this rule, covered 
entities are those that operate a health program or activity that receives 
federal funding and any entity established under the ACA to administer 
health care (e.g., health care exchanges), including health insurers, 
hospitals, health care clinics, and Medicaid agencies and contractors.20 
Given that step therapy is a part of a health plan’s benefit design, if a 
step therapy policy is required for most or all drugs used to treat a 
particular condition in a manner that is inconsistent with medical 
evidence, that policy may violate the nondiscrimination provision and its 
implementing regulations.  Such a policy discriminates against 
individuals with that condition and places an undue burden on them to 
receive necessary therapies.21  It requires the individual to take a less than 
optimally effective treatment for a period of time, resulting in a delay of 
proper treatment.22  In one case, for example, a physician prescribed a 
biologic infusion treatment to an individual with rheumatoid arthritis.23  
The physician submitted proof that the medications the individual’s 
insurer required her to step through were ineffective and that her 
rheumatoid arthritis had progressed to the point where she lost her job; 
could not drive or care for her son; and needed help with simple tasks, 
such as bathing.  Yet, her insurer required her to first attempt and “fail” 
on six other drugs over the course of one year before she could gain 
access to the originally prescribed biologic infusion treatment.24  This 
step therapy policy may violate the nondiscrimination provision because 
it is designed to create a burden on individuals with rheumatoid arthritis 
and delay access to effective treatment. 
 
placed on coverage of those treatments, including pharmacy tiers and any benefit utilization 
management policies. 
19. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,172, 54,189 (Sept. 
8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). 
20. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376 (May 18, 2016) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 92). 
21. See OHIO DEP’T OF INS., NON-DISCRIMINATION IN BENEFIT DESIGN 5 (2015), 
http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Company/Documents/2015_Non-
Discriminatory_Benefit_Design_QHP_Standards.pdf (clarifying nondiscrimination standards 
under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and giving examples). 
22. Spenser G. Benge, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: An Effective Means of 
Combatting Health Insurers’ Discrimination Against Individuals with HIV/AIDS?, 13 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 193, 225 (2016). 
23. Arloishia Israel, Insurers Win, Patients Lose with Step Therapy, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER 
(Dec. 14, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article49743935.html. 
24. Id. 
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2. The Medicaid Act: Reasonable Promptness Provision 
Step therapy may also violate the “reasonable promptness” provision 
of the Medicaid Act, which requires Medicaid plans to provide medical 
assistance “with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”25 
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, several of the federal circuits had 
interpreted the term “medical assistance” to mean only “financial 
assistance” for medical services and not the medical services 
themselves,26 serving to effectively foreclose most reasonable 
promptness suits.  But the ACA amended the Medicaid Act’s definition 
of “medical assistance” to clarify that the term includes “payment of part 
or all of the cost of . . . care and services or the care and services 
themselves, or both.”27  Therefore, a Medicaid enrollee can potentially 
bring a successful action pursuant to the reasonable promptness provision 
of the Medicaid Act when medical assistance is not provided in a 
reasonably prompt fashion (i.e., an insurer requires individuals to attempt 
and fail on less expensive treatments before covering the more effective 
treatments).28 
The Medicaid Act does not define “reasonable promptness,” and the 
few regulations related to the provision are not particularly 
illuminating.29  For example, the regulations provide that the responsible 
state agency must “furnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any 
delay caused by the agency’s administrative procedures,”30 and “continue 
to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals until they are 
found ineligible.”31  The lack of regulatory clarity on the meaning of 
reasonable promptness may be due to the fact that what qualifies as a 
reasonably prompt provision of care depends entirely on the condition 
that the care is treating.32 
Given the provision’s vague language, courts have failed to formulate 
a consistent standard in making reasonable promptness determinations.  
Nonetheless, courts may find defendants liable for violating the 
 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2015); Jeffrey Chen, In the Nick of Time: Using the Reasonable 
Promptness Provision to Challenge Medicaid Spending Cutbacks, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 349, 349 (2015). 
26. Chen, supra note 25, at 370. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2015) (emphasis added). 
28. As used in this Article, the term “enrollee” means an individual who has enrolled in a private 
or federally funded insurance plan, including Medicare, Medicaid, or marketplace exchange plans. 
29. Chen, supra note 25, at 373. 
30. 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a) (2013). 
31. Id. § 435.930(b). 
32. See id. (“The agency must . . . [c]ontinue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible 
individuals until they are found to be ineligible.”). 
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provision, which may lend support to a potential plaintiff’s case.  For 
example, Sobky v. Smoley supports the proposition that any delay in the 
delivery of services is a violation of the provision.33  There, the court 
found the State of California liable for failing to comply with the 
reasonable promptness provision where insufficient funding from 
California’s Medicaid program caused providers of methadone 
maintenance therapy to place eligible individuals with substance use 
disorders on waiting lists for treatment.34 
In Oklahoma Chapter of American Academy of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 
the Northern District of Oklahoma found that the defendant violated the 
reasonable promptness provision when the plaintiffs offered substantial 
evidence that the delays in treatment for children with specific conditions 
[were] medically inappropriate.35  Furthermore, the plaintiffs showed that 
system-wide delays for treatment existed and were unreasonable.36  This 
case may suggest that a Medicaid program has violated the reasonable 
promptness provision if a plaintiff can show that enrollees are subject to 
“medically inappropriate” delays.37 
These cases demonstrate that unreasonable delays to prescribed 
treatment for Medicaid enrollees, such as the delays resulting from step 
therapy policies, may give rise to a cause of action for a violation of the 
reasonable promptness provision.  For example, step therapy 
unreasonably delays access to treatment for Medicaid enrollees by 
requiring enrollees to start on treatments that are less effective or not 
effective at all, or ones that cause known adverse events before starting a 
prescribed treatment.  Furthermore, delays caused by step therapy 
protocols unsupported by medical evidence that require enrollees to first 
fail on medications with known, severe adverse effects, are not only 
medically inappropriate, but also unethical.  Therefore, Medicaid 
enrollees may have a claim under the reasonable promptness provision of 
the Medicaid statute if they cannot access the treatment prescribed to 
them due to a burdensome step therapy policy. 
3.  State Claim Based on the Interference with the Physician-Patient 
Relationship 
Burdensome step therapy policies may meet the standards for 
intentional interference with a contractual relationship (i.e., a common 
 
33. Id.; Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 1994). 
34. Sobky, 855 F. Supp. at 1140. 
35. Okla. Chapter of Am. Acad. Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1109 (N.D. Okla. 
2005). 
36. Id. 
37. Chen, supra note 25, at 375. 
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law tort) because they significantly disrupt the physician-patient 
relationship, preventing physicians from fulfilling their duty and 
affecting the health and well-being of patients. 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a claim for intentional 
interference with a contractual relationship exists if (1) there is a valid 
contract; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the contract; (3) the 
defendant acted intentionally and improperly; and (4) the plaintiff was 
injured by the defendant’s actions beyond the fact of the interference 
itself (“Restatement elements”).38  A defendant’s liability “may arise 
from improper motives or from the use of improper means.”39 
The Restatement of Torts is relevant here because the physician-
patient relationship creates a contract, whether it be express or implied, 
pursuant to which the physician must treat the patient with proper 
professional skill and the patient must pay for such treatment.40  Once the 
contractual relationship forms, the physician has a duty to bring skill and 
care to treat the condition,41 and to make decisions in the best interest of 
the patient.42  In Baptist Health v. Murphy, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
considered the issue of intentional interference in the context of the 
physician-patient relationship.43  In Murphy, the board of trustees of the 
defendant, Baptist Health, instituted a policy that prohibited physicians 
who owned an interest in a competing hospital from practicing at Baptist 
Health.44  Pursuant to the policy, the plaintiffs-physicians sued for 
tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business 
expectancy when Baptist Health restricted the physicians from practicing 
at Baptist Health because they owned an interest in a competing specialty 
heart hospital.45  The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the hospital 
 
38. United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Mass. 1990). 
39. Id. 
40. AMY G. GORE ET AL., 61 AM. JURIS. § 130 (2d ed. 2017); J. Gregory Lennon, Easing the 
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Restricting the Creation of Duty Through an Implied Doctor-Patient 
Relationship, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 363, 365 (2004). 
41. GORE ET AL., supra note 40, § 130; Lennon, supra note 40, at 365. 
42. See, e.g., STATE MED. BD. OF OHIO, STATEMENT OF THE STATE MEDICAL BOARD OF OHIO 
ON THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 2 (2012), 
http://www.med.ohio.gov/Portals/0/DNN/PDF-FOLDERS/Laws-Rules/Position-
Statements/Corporate-Practice-of-Medicine.pdf (“No matter the business entity, a physician must 
exercise professional judgment to render medical services based on the best interest of the 
patient.”); Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A 
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-
Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 234 (1999) (describing the 
guiding principles behind medical licensing boards). 
43. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 373 S.W.3d 269, 281–82 (Ark. 2010). 
44. Id. at 275. 
45. Id. at 281. 
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tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs-physicians’ relationships with 
their patients.46 
Like the conflict of interest policy in Murphy, an insurer’s step therapy 
policy could give rise to a patient’s or practitioner’s claim for tortious 
interference.  First, it is clear that a physician has a contractual 
relationship with a patient where a physician agrees to provide care and 
a patient agrees to accept care for a fee.47  It can be presumed that an 
insurer has knowledge of the physician-patient relationship and intends 
to interfere with that relationship when it requires compliance with a step 
therapy policy.48  Step therapy policies inherently influence decision 
making between patients and their doctors.  By enforcing such policies, 
insurers often require a physician to prescribe, and a patient to use and 
fail on, a medication different than the one deemed to be in the patient’s 
best interest. 
As to the damages element required for a claim for intentional 
interference with a contractual relationship, the defendant-hospital’s 
conflict of interest policy injured the Murphy physicians by disrupting the 
physician-patient relationship and causing a loss of professional fees.  
Likewise, step therapy policies disrupt physicians’ relationships with 
their patients because they take away a physician’s ability to make 
individualized health care decisions in the best interest of the patient.  
Furthermore, such policies increase the administrative burden and 
expense because physicians who seek an exception or appeal a denial for 
patients must spend time contacting the insurer.49  Physicians, nursing 
staff, and clinical staff spend approximately three weeks, twenty-three 
weeks, and forty-four weeks per year, respectively, interacting with 
insurers.50  The time spent communicating with insurers results in less 
time available to spend with patients, lower net professional fees, and 
higher costs for patients. 
From the patient’s perspective, the patient may experience harm to his 
or her health.  Step therapy policies negatively impact patient outcomes 
 
46. Id. at 289. 
47. Id. at 282. 
48. See id. at 284 (holding that “a party is presumed to intend the natural and probable 
consequences of his or her actions”). 
49. Adrienne Chung et al., Does a “One-Size-Fits-All” Formulary Policy Make Sense?, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 2, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/02/does-a-one-size-fits-
all-formulary-policy-make-sense/. 
50. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., What Does It Cost Physician Practices to Interact with Health 
Insurance Plans?, 28 HEALTH AFF. W533, W540 (2009), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/4/w533.full.pdf+html. 
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through delays in treatment and higher health care costs.51  Some policies 
require patients to fail on more than five different medications with 
adverse events for nearly two years before insurers will provide coverage 
for the prescribed medication.52  Furthermore, these policies result in 
patients spending a significant amount of time on the phone, in doctors’ 
offices, and in pharmacies. 
Lastly, to satisfy a prima facie case against an insurer for intentional 
interference, the plaintiff must show that the insurer’s conduct is 
improper.  In Murphy, the court reviewed the circuit court’s extensive 
findings of the hospital’s impropriety against the Restatement elements 
for improper conduct.  In short, the nature of Baptist Health’s conduct 
was against public policy because its conflict of interest policy disrupted 
the physician-patient relationship.53  In addition, the court held that the 
physicians’ interest in physician-patient relationships and the continuity 
of care outweighed Baptist Health’s interest in protecting its economic 
viability.54  The court reasoned that while society has a strong interest in 
Baptist Health’s continued viability, the evidence showed that its finances 
were never at risk.55 
When applying the Restatement elements to insurers’ use of step 
therapy policies, the factors may weigh in favor of physicians and 
patients.  Physicians’ interests are in the physician-patient relationship 
and satisfying their duty of care pursuant to that relationship.  Patients 
have an interest in their own health and well-being, as well as decreasing 
the costs of health care.  But insurers’ principal motive in utilizing step 
therapy policies is to decrease their short-term costs.  Insurers implement 
these policies despite their negative effect on physicians and patients, and 
without regard to the long-term benefits and cost-savings associated with 
providing timely access to the prescribed treatment. 
B.  Adverse Tiering 
Drug formularies (i.e., insurers’ lists of medications approved for 
coverage) often classify medications into tiers based on price.56  While 
insurers usually charge a flat-rate copayment for prescriptions on lower 
 
51. Limiting Step Therapy Policies to Protect Patients, CAL. RHEUMATOLOGY ALLIANCE, 
http://cqrcengage.com/cra/steptherapy (last visited May 7, 2017). 
52. Id. 
53. Baptist Health, 373 S.W.3d at 286. 
54. Id. at 286–87. 
55. Id. at 287. 
56. Joseph J. Hylak-Reinholtz & Jay R. Naftzger, Is It Time to Shed a “Tier” for Four-Tier 
Prescription Drug Formularies?  Specialty Drug Tiers May Violate HIPAA’s Anti-Discrimination 
Provisions and Statutory Goals, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 22, 34 (2011). 
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tiers,57 they may charge a percentage of the drug cost (i.e., coinsurance) 
for prescriptions on upper tiers, sometimes referred to as “specialty 
tiers.”58  Specialty tiers typically contain many innovative and life-saving 
drugs that tend to be costlier. 
While specialty tiers were once reserved for treatments of rare 
diseases, they are now often used for drugs that treat chronic conditions, 
including cancer, HIV, and rheumatoid arthritis.59  Given that 
coinsurance in specialty tiers typically ranges from 20 to 50 percent of a 
drug’s cost,60 consumers may be required to pay thousands of dollars a 
month for vital medications.61  The ACA currently limits out-of-pocket 
maximums for health care costs to $7,150 for individuals and $14,300 for 
families for 2017 individual, small-group, large-group, and self-insured 
plans.62  Nevertheless, a single treatment may cost over $12,750, 
meaning that the family has the financial burden of paying that cost 
upfront.  Moreover, it is quite common for Medicare beneficiaries to 
spend more than $600 per month on specialty medications.63 
In a growing trend, insurers have placed most or all drugs that treat a 
specific condition, including generics, on the highest cost specialty tiers, 
making treatment for individuals with that illness unaffordable and 
inaccessible.64  This practice is often referred to as “adverse tiering.”  For 
example, in 2015, 51 percent of silver plans placed all multiple sclerosis 
drugs on a specialty tier (up from 42 percent in 2014).65  Likewise, a 
recent study showed that most insurance plans in California, Florida, 
Illinois, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington placed all, or nearly all, 
 
57. Id. at 36–38. 
58. Chad Brooker, Waging War on Specialty Pharmaceutical Tiering in Pharmacy Benefit 
Design, 7 HEALTH L. & POL’Y BRIEF 25, 29 (2013). 
59. DEL. HEALTH CARE COMM’N, SPECIALTY-TIER PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: REPORT TO THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (2012), http://dhss.delaware.gov/dhss/dhcc/files/tierdrugreport.pdf. 
60. Brooker, supra note 58, at 29. 
61. Id. 
62. HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,826 (Feb. 
27, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 147, 153, 154, 155, 156, and 158); Out-of-Pocket 
Maximum Limits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/out-of-pocket-
maximum-limit/ (last visited May 22, 2017). 
63. Jack Hoadley et al., It Pays to Shop: Variation in Out-of-Pocket Costs for Medicare Part D 
Enrollees in 2016, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 2, 2015, http://kff.org/report-section/it-pays-to-
shop-variation-in-out-of-pocket-costs-for-medicare-part-d-enrollees-in-2016-findings/. 
64. HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,821, 
10,823 (Feb. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 147, 153, 154, 155, 156, and 158). 
65. AVALERE, AVALERE PLANSCAPE ANALYSIS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG TIER PLACEMENT 
AND COST SHARING IN HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE PLANS 4 (2015), 
http://go.avalere.com/acton/attachment/12909/f-017c/1/-/-/-/-
/20150211_Avalere%20Planscape%202015_Class%20Tiering%20Analysis.pdf. 
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of twenty-two well-known cancer medications into the highest-cost tier.66  
Higher cost sharing can often have a negative impact on plan enrollees 
seeking coverage of treatments in specialty tiers, including skipping 
doses or missing treatments, thereby resulting in adverse events and 
development of drug resistance.67 
1.  The ACA’s Nondiscrimination and Preexisting Condition Provisions 
Adverse tiering could violate the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision 
and its implementing regulations.  The ACA also prohibits insurers from 
imposing a “preexisting condition exclusion,” which is “a limitation or 
exclusion of benefits relating to a condition based on the fact that the 
condition was present before the date of enrollment for such coverage, 
whether or not any medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was 
recommended or received before such date.”68  Yet, insurers often use 
adverse tiering to discourage individuals with preexisting conditions 
from enrolling in health plans because the applicable treatments are 
inadequately covered.  Therefore, adverse tiering schemes could 
effectively serve as preexisting-condition exclusions. 
The ACA also prohibits insurers from employing “marketing practices 
or benefit designs that have the effect of discouraging the enrollment in 
such plans by individuals with significant health needs.”69  A 2015 HHS 
regulation further clarified that insurers may violate the 
nondiscrimination provision if they place most or all drugs for a certain 
condition on a formulary’s highest cost tier if there is no appropriate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the practice or without regard to the actual 
cost the insurer pays for the drug.70  The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”), which reportedly covers 100 million people 
through Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care programs, has 
emphasized this point.71  A representative of CMS stated that while 
 
66. Julie Appleby, Cancer Meds Often Bring Big Out-of-Pocket Costs for Patients, Report 
Finds, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://khn.org/news/cancer-meds-often-bring-big-
out-of-pocket-costs-for-patients-report-finds/. 
67. Administrative Complaint at 3, The AIDS Inst. v. Coventry Health Care, Inc., (May 29, 
2014), 
http://www.natap.org/2014/newsUpdates/NHeLPTheAIDSInstituteHIVcomplaintHHSOCR5.29.1
4copy.pdf [hereinafter AIDS Institute Administrative Complaint]. 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2015). 
69. Id. § 18031(c)(1)(a); 45 C.F.R. § 156.225(b) (2017). 
70. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 54,189 (May 
18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). 
71. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,434 (stating 
that “placing most or all prescription medications that are used to treat a specific condition on the 
highest cost formulary tiers” is an example of a discriminatory benefit design); CMS Covers 100 
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having a specialty tier is not discriminatory on its face, adverse tiering 
may be discriminatory in application “when looking at the totality of the 
circumstances.”72 
In September 2016, the Center for Health Law and Policy Innovation 
of Harvard Law School (“CHLPI”) and the AIDS Foundation of Chicago 
filed an administrative complaint with the HHS Office of Civil Rights 
(“OCR”) alleging that the cost-sharing design that Humana employed in 
its marketplace exchange plans discriminated against individuals with 
HIV in violation of the nondiscrimination provision, the preexisting 
condition provision, and the ACA regulations.73  The complaint argued 
that a benefit design may be discriminatory if it does not provide 
meaningful access to a certain patient population.  Access is not 
meaningful if the patient population is not afforded the same 
opportunities to benefit from the services that are available to others.74 
The complaint stated that the insurer’s formulary placed sixteen of the 
twenty-four most common HIV medications in its highest cost-sharing 
tier, with coinsurance rates between 40 and 50 percent.75  Therefore, an 
individual enrolled in Humana’s Illinois qualified health plan (“QHP”) 
was allegedly required to spend between 8 and 14 percent of his or her 
average monthly income for an HIV treatment regimen.76  By 
comparison, Humana only required a fifty dollar copay for two similarly 
priced chemotherapy medications, or around 1 percent of the Illinois 
median household income.77  The groups argued that such cost-
prohibitive adverse tiering subjected those with HIV to discrimination by 
preventing meaningful access available to other patient populations.  
Such policies also allegedly led individuals with HIV to avoid enrolling 
in, or withdrawing from, Humana’s plans altogether, thereby serving as 
a preexisting condition exclusion.78  While HHS has yet to respond to the 
 
Million People, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ (last visited Apr. 
17, 2017).  CMS has sole enforcement authority in four states and concurrent enforcement authority 
in the remainder of states.  Compliance and Enforcement, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/cciio/programs-and-initiatives/health-insurance-market-
reforms/compliance.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
72. Bob Herman, Aetna Revises HIV Drug Policy for All Exchange Plans, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150327/NEWS/150329914. 
73. Administrative Complaint at 2, Ctr. for Health Law & Policy Innovation v. Humana (Sept. 
6, 2016), http://www.aidschicago.org/resources/content/9/2/5/documents/ocr-complaint-humana-
1.pdf. 
74. Id. at 7. 
75. Id. at 8. 
76. Id. at 9. 
77. Id. at 12. 
78. Id. at 3. 
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complaint, Humana’s actions, if true, would be in direct conflict with the 
nondiscrimination provision, the preexisting condition provision, and the 
ACA’s implementing regulations. 
2.  The Federal Rehabilitation Act 
Adverse tiering may also violate the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(“Rehab Act”).  The Rehab Act prohibits programs and services that 
receive federal funds from providing “benefits or services in a manner 
that limits or has the effect of limiting the participation of qualified 
persons with disabilities.”79  It states that no otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability “shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, 
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under a program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”80  The Rehab Act’s implementing regulations 
define “disability” as (1) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as 
having such impairment.81  The Rehab Act applies to federally funded 
health plans and if any such health plan imposes a discriminatory adverse 
tiering policy, plan enrollees may be able to bring a claim under the 
Rehab Act.82 
In Alexander v. Choate, Medicaid recipients challenged Tennessee’s 
decision to reduce the annual cap on reimbursed hospital days from 
twenty to fourteen days.83  The plaintiffs argued that the reduction had a 
disproportionate effect on individuals with disabilities in violation of the 
Rehab Act.  The court balanced the individuals’ medical needs against 
the State’s burden to determine whether the plaintiffs had “meaningful 
access” to health care.84  The court cited three relevant factors in its 
analysis of meaningful access: (1) the reductions must not “have a 
particular exclusionary effect” on an individual with a disability; (2) the 
limitation must be neutral on its face; and (3) the individual must be able 
to benefit meaningfully from the coverage, although it ultimately ruled in 
favor of the defendants finding that the reduction in annual inpatient 
 
79. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(a)(iv) (2004). 
80. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2015). 
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) (2004). 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2015).  The ACA explicitly states that the Rehab Act applies to federally 
funded health plans, clearing up previous ambiguity.  Id. 
83. Alexander Abbe, “Meaningful Access” to Health Care and the Remedies Available to 
Medicaid Managed Care Recipients Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 147 U. PENN. L. 
R. 1161, 1166 (1999). 
84. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985). 
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hospital days did not result in discrimination.85 
In Katie A., ex rel. Ludin v. Los Angeles City, the Ninth Circuit further 
elaborated on the Choate test that the required services must be provided 
in “an effective manner.”86  A plan benefit design may be considered 
ineffective for the purposes of the Rehab Act if it does not provide the 
individual with a disability with the same opportunities to benefit from 
the services that are available to others.87 
Pursuant to the opinions of the courts, it can be argued that Medicare, 
Medicaid, and exchange plans deny meaningful access to health care for 
individuals with disabilities if they employ adverse tiering, thereby 
violating the Rehab Act.  For example, CHLPI and the AIDS Research 
Consortium of Atlanta filed an administrative complaint with OCR in 
September 2016 alleging that Humana, through its exchange plans, 
unlawfully discriminated against individuals with HIV in violation of the 
Rehab Act.88  The complainants alleged that Humana placed sixteen out 
of the twenty-two HIV medications on the highest cost-sharing tier within 
each of its five QHPs, thereby intentionally making such medications 
unaffordable for the majority of individuals with HIV on that plan.89  The 
groups provided statistics showing that Humana enrollees with HIV had 
to spend between 17 and 30 percent of the median monthly income in 
Georgia to receive their medications.90  This problem is exacerbated by 
the fact that over 18 percent of Georgia residents live in poverty, and 23 
percent of those impoverished residents have HIV.91 
The complainants also argued that Humana’s benefit design is outside 
of market norms in Georgia, with the majority of other insurers in the 
state offering HIV drug benefits at a significantly lower cost than 
Humana.  The complainants stated that these prohibitively high cost-
sharing levels discourage any reasonable individual with HIV from 
enrolling or staying in Humana’s QHPs, amounting to a de facto denial 
of meaningful access in violation of the Rehab Act.92  This case is 
currently pending. 
In sum, adverse tiering may violate the Rehab Act because such a 
 
85. Id. at 302. 
86. Katie A. v. L.A. Cty., 481 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007); Administrative Complaint, Ctr. 
for Health L. & Pol’y Innovation v. Humana (Sept. 6, 2016), 
http://media.bizj.us/view/img/10145208/ga-humana.pdf. 
87. Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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policy often limits qualified persons with disabilities from participating 
properly in their health plans. 
3.  State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
Adverse tiering may also violate state unfair and deceptive trade 
practice (“UDTP”) laws, which are generally intended to protect 
consumers from predatory business practices.93  Though UDTP laws vary 
from state to state, every state has at least one consumer protection law 
that prohibits deceptive trade practices, such as bait-and-switch tactics, 
false or misleading advertising, and other fraudulent marketing 
practices.94  A majority of states prohibit unfair acts and practices, and a 
minority of states have laws prohibiting unconscionable business 
practices.95 
States also have UDTP laws that target specific industries and 
practices.96  For example, a Florida law prohibits unfair practices in the 
underwriting of insurance with respect to HIV by preventing health 
insurance policies from limiting coverage for medications or treatments 
for HIV.97  Therefore, this Florida law reduces the possibility that an 
insurer could unfairly discriminate against an individual purchasing 
insurance. 
In 2014, the AIDS Institute and the National Health Law Program filed 
a complaint with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulations (“OIR”) 
against four Florida insurers—Coventry Health Care, Cigna, Humana, 
and Preferred Medical.98  The complainants alleged that the insurers 
placed all drugs used to treat HIV, including generics, in the highest cost-
sharing tier for which a 40–50 percent coinsurance applied.99  In 
comparison, other insurers varied tiering, or placed HIV drugs on more 
affordable tiers.100  The complainants argued that the defendants-
insurers’ policies violated Florida law by discriminating against 
 
93. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. INC, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 13 
(2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf. 
94. JULIE RALSTON AOKI, PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR. AT WILLIAM MITCHELL COLL. OF LAW, 
CONSUMER PROTECTION: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (2010), 
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/phlc-fs-agconsumer-2010.pdf. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429 (2013); Consent Order, In Re Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 
162232-14-CO (Off. of Ins. Reg. 2014), http://www.floir.com/siteDocuments/Cigna162232-14-
CO.pdf. 
98. AIDS Institute Administrative Complaint, supra note 67, at 2. 
99. Id. at 9. 
100. Id. 
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individuals with HIV and deterring such individuals from enrolling in the 
insurers’ QHPs.  Several months after the public interest groups filed the 
complaint, the OIR ultimately settled with all four insurers without 
making any finding on whether the insurers violated Florida law.  But 
subsequent to the settlement, each insurer agreed to make changes to its 
drug benefit designs. 
Cigna agreed to relocate generic HIV medications to a lower cost tier 
and cap customers’ costs on certain drugs to $200 per month.101  It also 
agreed to remove the thirty-day supply limit per prescription for HIV 
medications.  Similarly, Humana agreed to limit its subscribers’ cost-
sharing responsibilities for all HIV medications and move all such 
medications below a certain cost to a lower tier.102  The Cigna and 
Humana agreements applied only to their exchange plans in Florida, 
however.103  Aetna (which wholly owns Coventry Health) agreed to 
move nearly all HIV medications across all of its exchange plans 
nationwide to lower-cost generic or nonpreferred tiers, effective June 1, 
2015.104  Preferred Medical, the last to respond, issued a letter in early 
2015 stating that it would cap out-of-pocket costs at $200 per month for 
certain HIV medications.105 
Subsequent to the settlement agreements, OIR issued a notice in spring 
2015 to all Florida insurers warning them that OIR would begin 
“reviewing 2016 [QHPs] for possible discriminatory practices in how 
they cover all prescription medications,” and that the office “would deem 
plans as discriminatory if the tiered formulary of HIV medications was 
not at least as favorable as the state’s benchmark plan.”106  The action 
taken by OIR is a strong indication that adverse tiering practices may 
violate UDTP laws, such as Florida law. 
 
101. Associated Press, Cigna Changes Plan Amid HIV Drug Complaint, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141108/INFO/311089945. 
102. Letter from Steve DeRaleau, President, HumanaOne, & Kevin M. McCarty, Comm’r, Fla. 
Office of Ins. Regulation, to Kevin M. McCarty, Comm’r, Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation (Dec. 15, 
2014), 
http://www.theaidsinstitute.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Humana%20Medical%20Plan%20a
nd%20OIR%20agreement%20dec%202014.pdf. 
103. Herman, supra note 72. 
104. Id. 
105. Letter from Tamara Meyerson, President & CEO, Preferred Med. Plan, to Kevin M. 
McCarty, Comm’r, Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/health-
care/article7893081.ece/binary/Preferred%20OIR%20Letter.pdf. 
106. Daylina Miller, Insurance Regulators to Cap HIV Drug Costs, HEALTH NEWS FLA. (June 
29, 2015), http://health.wusf.usf.edu/post/insurance-regulators-cap-hiv-drug-costs#stream/0. 
11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2017  11:10 AM 
2017] Now or Never 1059 
C.  Nonmedical Switching 
Nonmedical switching occurs when an insurer requires a stable patient 
to switch from his or her current, effective medication to a cheaper, 
alternative drug.107  An insurer effectuates nonmedical switching by 
moving a drug to a higher cost tier, increasing the out-of-pocket costs 
owed after the plan year has begun, or dropping a medication from the 
formulary altogether.  Nonmedical switching does not involve switching 
a patient from a brand-name drug to a generic drug, but instead, from one 
drug to an entirely different, therapeutic equivalent.108  Nonmedical 
switching is done without consideration of the medical repercussions or 
reasoning behind the prescriber’s selection of the original medication, 
and often without the prescriber’s knowledge.109 
Recent studies have determined that nonmedical switching does not 
save money or maintain quality of care.110  Instead, nonmedical switching 
disrupts the individual’s medication stability, which can cause adverse 
reactions and loss of effectiveness, resulting in high-cost medical 
outcomes.111  Yet, many plans continue to employ this bait-and-switch 
tactic.  For example, half of the plans in a 2015 study revised their 
formularies after the plan year began.112  Of the forty-one plans with 
revised formularies, thirty-three reduced drug coverage, twenty-seven 
eliminated coverage for up to seven medications across classes, and six 
plans removed between fifteen and fifty-seven products, reducing 
formulary coverage by 6 percent to 63 percent.113 
 
107. Non-Medical Switching, COALITION ST. RHEUMATOLOGY ORG., 
http://www.csro.info/Switching (last visited May 7, 2017). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See, e.g., Bryan R. Cote & Elizabeth A. Petersen, Impact of Therapeutic Switching in Long-
Term Care, 14 AM. J. MANAGED CARE SP23, SP23 (2008) (concluding that nonmedical switching 
in long-term care settings increased administrative time, side effects, and downstream costs to 
plans); D.T. Rubin et al., P354 Analysis of Outcomes After Non-Medical Switching of Anti-Tumor 
Necrosis Factor Agents, EUR. CROHN’S & COLITIS ORG. (2015), https://www.ecco-
ibd.eu/index.php/publications/congress-abstract-s/abstracts-2015/item/p354-analysis-of-
outcomes-after-non-medical-switching-of-anti-tumor-necrosis-factor-agents.html (finding that 
“non-medical switching of anti-TNF agents was associated with an increase in side effects and lack 
of efficacy that led to subsequent treatment change as well as increases in health care utilization”). 
111. Non-Medical Switching, supra note 107. 
112. AVALERE, supra note 65. 
113. Karyn Schwartz, New Analysis: Midyear Formulary Changes in Marketplace Plans Can 
Significantly Reduce Access to Needed Medications for Patients, PHRMA (Feb. 5, 2015), 
http://catalyst.phrma.org/new-analysis-midyear-formulary-changes-in-marketplace-plans-can-
significantly-reduce-access-to-needed-medications-for-patients. 
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1.  State Breach of Contract Claim 
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the enrollee; 
therefore, the insurer has a duty to honor the plan terms as they are written 
at the start of the plan year, including terms pertaining to the drug 
formulary, drug tiers, and cost-sharing structure.114  Absent a contract 
provision granting the insurer a right to unilaterally modify these terms, 
the insurer breaches its duty to honor the plan language when it engages 
in nonmedical switching practices.  In some states, even if the contract 
contains a provision permitting a unilateral modification to the plan, such 
provision may not be valid.115  For example, Utah law states that a 
modification of an insurance contract during the term of the policy must 
be in writing and agreed to by the parties against whose interest the 
modification operates.116 
Nonmedical switching may constitute a breach of contract because it 
is a unilateral change to an insurance policy after the enrollee has enrolled 
in a plan.  To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, the plan enrollee 
must establish the existence of a contract, an obligation or duty arising 
out of the contract, a breach of that obligation, and damages caused by 
the breach.117 
Unilateral modifications often cause individuals to incur damages due 
to the forced change in medication.  These damages come in many forms, 
including health complications due to the regimen change, increased 
emergency room visits, lab tests, and other costly interventions.  For 
example, in Taub v. Blue Cross of California, an insurer sent a letter two 
months into the plan year to its enrollees stating that it planned to 
unilaterally reduce the plan’s coverage scope by increasing the deductible 
from $1,500 to $1,750.  As a result, the plaintiffs filed a suit and argued 
that the insurer breached its contract with its enrollees by unilaterally 
changing annual deductibles, copay obligations, and other plan terms and 
benefits after the plan year had begun, thereby severely degrading the 
level and quality of health services that enrollees were able to access.118  
The insurer argued that its contracts permitted the plan increases with 
proper notice.  The plaintiffs alleged that the insurer breached the terms 
 
114. Anderson v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 443 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
115. Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1024 (10th Cir. 1993). 
116. See id. (discussing UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-19-26 (repealed 1985)).  It should be noted that 
this statute created an exemption for ERISA plans. 
117. Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009). 
118. Taub v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. BC457809 (May 31, 2015), 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/kassouf_taub_-
_settlement_agreement.5.29.15_noe.pdf (class settlement agreement and release) [hereinafter 
Taub, settlement agreement]. 
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and provisions of the health insurance contract by refusing to pay for 
benefits promised under the contract.119  The case settled, and in October 
2015, Anthem agreed to reimburse 50,000 consumers, totaling around 
$8.3 million.120  In addition, Anthem agreed to refrain from making 
subsequent mid-year changes to deductibles, copays, or other plan terms 
in the future, thereby holding the insurer accountable for the promises it 
made in the insurance contract.121 
In sum, if an insurer implements nonmedical switching by dropping a 
medication from the policy’s formulary, increasing out-of-pocket 
spending, or placing the medication on a higher cost tier, it is unilaterally 
modifying its policy after the plan year has begun.  The enrollee incurs 
damages if an insurer requires an enrollee to pay additional out-of-pocket 
costs, endure adverse events, or take a different medication.  Therefore, 
given that the policy is a contract between the enrollee and the insurer, 
the enrollee may have a claim for breach of contract, depending on the 
contract terms and the jurisdiction. 
2.  State Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim 
Nonmedical switching policies may also result in a breach of duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.122  Every contract imposes a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing,123 which requires both honesty and reasonableness 
in the enforcement of the contract.124  This duty prevents one contracting 
party from unfairly frustrating the other party’s right to receive the 
benefits of the agreement actually made.125  Courts have found that an 
insurer has an implied-in-law duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with 
the plan enrollee to ensure that the enrollee receives the policy 
benefits.126  This protection is in place largely because the enrollee lacks 
 
119. Id. 
120. Samantha Masunaga, Anthem Blue Cross to Repay $8.3 Million to California Customers, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-blue-cross-
settlement-20151027-story.html (discussing the settlement agreed to by Anthem Blue Cross after 
accusations of breach of contract and engaging in unfair business practices). 
121. Id. 
122. It is important to note that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists for all 
contracts.  But there is a related tort, referred to as “insurance bad faith.”  Some courts have 
conflated the two concepts.  This Part refers only to the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, whereas the tort of insurance bad faith is discussed in detail, infra, Part I.D.5. 
123. It should be noted that ERISA preempts any state law claims for breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealing.  Dockter v. Aetna Life Co., 510 U.S. 917, 919 (1993).  Therefore, individuals 
with employer-sponsored plans should not bring this claim.  Id. 
124. Florence Urgent Care v. Healthspan, Inc., 445 F.Supp.2d 871, 879 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 
125. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1111–12 (Cal. 2000). 
126. E.g., Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d 1080, 1093 (Okla. 2005); Christian v. Am. 
Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 901 (Okla. 1977).  In the Fifth Circuit, an insurer breaches the 
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bargaining power and cannot protect himself or herself from the kinds of 
hardships that an insurer may impose (e.g., nonmedical switching 
policies).127 
When nonmedical switching occurs, either when an insurer drops a 
medication from a formulary or increases out-of-pocket costs, the insurer 
breaches its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly because the insurer 
is frustrating the ability of the enrollee to receive the benefits originally 
anticipated when the individual signed up for that insurance policy.  For 
example, in Taub,128 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-insurer 
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing because it unreasonably 
changed the scope of coverage under the health insurance contracts after 
the plan year had begun, and denied enrollees the coverage that they 
purchased for the entire year, which led to denials of enrollees’ insurance 
coverage claims.129  As the proximate result of such unreasonable and 
bad faith conduct, plaintiffs suffered damages.130 
In sum, given that insurers contract with plan enrollees, they owe the 
enrollees a duty of good faith and fair dealing.  This duty requires insurers 
to reasonably guarantee that the enrollees will receive the benefits 
promised to them.  When insurers implement nonmedical switching 
policies, individuals cannot access medications that the insurer originally 
promised to cover with the agreed-upon out-of-pocket costs, thereby 
breaching the duty to act in good faith and deal fairly.  Therefore, 
nonmedical switching could result in a claim for bad faith. 
3.  State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
Additionally, nonmedical switching may violate states’ UDTP laws.131  
For example, in 2011, plan enrollees filed a class action in California 
against Anthem Blue Cross alleging that Anthem used unlawful bait-and-
switch tactics to dramatically increase annual deductibles and other 
yearly out-of-pocket costs after the plan year had begun, in violation of 
California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) and Unfair 
 
duty of good faith and fair dealing if it “has no reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment 
of a claim.”  Henry v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 503 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).  
Therefore, in the Fifth Circuit, a claim alleging a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
against an insurer will likely fail if the insurer had any reasonable basis for denying coverage.  Id. 
127. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902; Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co, 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 403–04 
(1970). 
128. For the facts in this case, see supra Part I.C.1. 
129. Taub, settlement agreement, supra note 118. 
130. Id. 
131. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing state legislation aimed at limiting specialty tiers). 
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Competition Law (“UCL”).132  The complaint stated that Anthem 
violated the CLRA.  The plaintiffs further alleged that Anthem marketed 
its health plans in a misleading manner by stating the plan had “annual” 
deductibles and other “yearly” benefits and out-of-pocket costs when it 
did not.  The complaint also stated that the defendant unilaterally 
increased its annual deductibles and out-of-pocket costs after the plan 
year had begun, thereby forcing plan enrollees to pay more than the plan 
initially stated; adopted a new contract term that allowed the insurer to 
change its plan as long as it provided sixty days’ notice to enrollees; and 
advertised particular services without the intent to sell them.133 
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that Anthem violated the UCL by 
engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, including 
advertising and soliciting business in an untrue, misleading, and 
deceptive manner.  For example, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant 
used deceptive coverage descriptions regarding annual deductibles and 
out-of-pocket costs and benefits; made inaccurate representations about 
coverage offered; and misleadingly implied that contract terms and 
benefits remained unchanged throughout a calendar year.134 
The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered harm as a result of these 
practices because they had to pay significantly more out-of-pocket costs 
than they initially agreed.135  In April 2015, Anthem settled the class 
action by agreeing to pay the plaintiffs up to $8.2 million.136  Anthem 
also agreed that, in the future, it would not make any material 
modifications after the plan year began to any California-issued 
individual health plans, unless a change in regulation or law supported 
such mid-calendar-year modifications.137 
Nonmedical switching is a unilateral modification to a health plan, 
often executed in the middle of a plan year, and is analogous to the 
unilateral modifications at issue in the Anthem Blue Cross class action 
lawsuit.  Enrollees rely on representations and marketing materials 
regarding the cost and availability of medications when deciding whether 
to purchase a health insurance plan.  By unilaterally changing a drug 
formulary, removing a drug from the formulary altogether, or increasing 
cost sharing for the drug, an insurer arguably changes the terms of the 
plan and forces the plan enrollee either to pay more than promised or to 
 
132. Complaint, Kassouf v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. BC473408, 2011 WL 5561811 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2011). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Masunaga, supra note 120. 
137. Id. 
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change the course of treatment and put his or her health at risk.  These 
actions are unfair and deceptive and, therefore, may be actionable under 
UDTP laws. 
D.  Prior Authorization 
Prior authorization policies require a physician or a plan enrollee to 
obtain the insurer’s advance approval before the insurer will cover the 
cost of certain treatments and medications.138  After the request, the 
insurer then conducts a review to determine if the treatment is medically 
necessary.  While the definition of “medical necessity” varies from plan 
to plan, the following definition from New Mexico Administrative Code 
is an example: 
[H]ealth care services determined by a provider, in consultation with 
the health care insurer, to be appropriate or necessary, according to any 
applicable generally accepted principles and practices of good medical 
care or practice guidelines developed by the federal government, 
national or professional medical societies, boards and associations, or 
any applicable clinical protocols or practice guidelines developed by the 
health care insurer consistent with such federal, national, and 
professional practice guidelines, for the diagnosis or direct care and 
treatment of a physical, behavioral, or mental health condition, illness, 
injury, or disease.139 
The process is often burdensome and can delay or interrupt care, waste 
time, and complicate medical decisions.140  It often involves completing 
various forms using outdated modes of communication (e.g., paper copies 
submitted via mail or fax) and lengthy follow-up calls.141  A recent study 
showed that the cost of conducting a standard medical-necessity review 
often exceeds the savings generated in most areas of medicine.142  
According to a national survey, the prior authorization process costs the 
 
138. Philippe Saxe, Commentary: Time to Reform Costly, Burdensome Prior Authorization and 
‘First Fail’ Protocols, PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 2, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/opinion/commentary-time-to-reform-costly-
burdensome-prior-/nd3Zz/. 
139. N.M. CODE R. § 13.10.17.7(AA) (LexisNexis 2017); Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. 
Astrazeneca Pharm., 634 F.3d 1352, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2011). 
140. John Commins, Prior Authorization Hurts Patient Care, AMA Survey Finds, HEALTH 
LEADERS MEDIA (Nov. 23, 2010), http://healthleadersmedia.com/content/PHY-259364/Prior-
Authorization-Hurts-Patient-Care-AMA-Survey-Finds. 
141. AM. MED. ASS’N, STANDARDIZATION OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION PROCESS FOR MEDICAL 
SERVICES WHITE PAPER 10–11 (June 2011), 
http://massneuro.org/Resources/Transfer%20from%20old%20sit/AMA%20White%20Paper%20
on%20Standardizing%20Prior%20Authorization.pdf [hereinafter AMA WHITE PAPER]. 
142. Mark A. Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of Weight-Reduction 
Surgery, 53 DUKE L.J. 653, 664 (2003). 
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United States health care system an estimated $23–31 billion each 
year.143 
Moreover, insurers sometimes make prior authorization 
determinations that are inconsistent with medical standards of care and 
clinical recommendations.  A medical-necessity determination may place 
too much weight on cost savings rather than on the individual needs of 
plan enrollees, and initial determinations are often made by insurance 
representatives without medical training.144 
The prior authorization process is time consuming and can impose a 
significant impediment to health care.  Physicians spend an average of 
twenty hours per week completing paperwork to satisfy prior 
authorization requirements for treatments and tests, and it may be weeks 
before a physician receives a response, thereby causing an unnecessary 
delay in care.145  Even a short-term delay in access to medications for 
conditions such as HIV, cancer, and seizures poses a serious risk to the 
health and safety of plan enrollees, including permanent damage or 
death.146 
Additionally, more than half the physicians experience a 20 percent 
rejection rate from insurers on first-time prior authorization requests for 
medications.147  Oftentimes, each insurer may require a different form for 
each drug prescribed.  On top of that, these forms differ from insurer to 
insurer.  The sheer number of forms creates wide room for error, thereby 
resulting in denials.  If the insurer rejects the request for prior 
authorization, the enrollee can appeal, the provider can recommend an 
alternative treatment for which he or she might have to restart the prior 
authorization process from the beginning, the enrollee can pay for the 
service out of pocket, or, in the worse scenarios, the enrollee might give 
up and never receive the necessary treatment.  For these reasons, 
approximately 76 percent of physicians have switched treatments at least 
once to avoid the prior authorization process.148  As a result, enrollees 
 
143. Christopher P. Morley et al., The Impact of Prior Authorization Requirements on Primary 
Care Physicians’ Offices: Report of Two Parallel Network Studies, 26 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 
93, 93 (2013). 
144. AMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 141, at 21. 
145. Id. 
146. Letter from Brenda Tranchida, Dir., Program Compliance & Oversight Grp., Ctr. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Kary Shankar, CEO, Senior Official for Contracting, Fox Ins. Co. 
(Mar. 9, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-
and-Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Downloads/Fox_Termination_Letter.pdf [hereinafter 
Letter from Tranchida to Shankar]. 
147. AMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 141, at 21. 
148. FROST & SULLIVAN, THE IMPACT OF THE PRIOR AUTHORIZATION PROCESS ON BRANDED 
MEDICATIONS: PHYSICIAN REFERENCE, PHARMACIST EFFICIENCY AND BRAND MARKET SHARE 
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receive the treatment dictated by insurers instead of receiving the best 
treatment for their condition as determined by their physicians. 
1.  The Medicaid Act’s Payment for Covered Outpatient Drugs 
Provision 
Certain prior authorization policies may violate the Federal Medicaid 
Act’s section on the payment for covered outpatient drugs.  The statute 
states that if the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
approves a drug and the drug’s manufacturer has a rebate agreement with 
HHS, then the drug must be covered by state Medicaid programs, 
consistent with FDA labeling, and without discrimination in drug 
coverage.149  A state “may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, 
duration, or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible 
beneficiary solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or 
condition.”150  A Medicaid program must make a drug available 
whenever medically necessary.  But though available, prior authorization 
may limit payment to the drug’s FDA-approved uses.151  If the insurer 
denies treatment by rejecting the prior authorization request, the 
Medicaid program must give written notice explaining the reason for 
denial, provide an appeal, and allow a hearing to the Medicaid 
enrollee.152  Despite these requirements, many states have adopted 
cumbersome, and potentially illegal, prior authorization procedures. 
In B.E. & A.R. v. Teeter, Medicaid enrollees brought suit against the 
Washington State Health Care Authority (“WHCA”) (i.e., the state 
Medicaid program) for arbitrarily restricting access to hepatitis C 
medications.153  In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the WHCA had instituted overly burdensome prior 
authorization requirements in violation of the Medicaid Act.154  The 
WHCA limited access to a medication that could not only prevent 
progression of hepatitis C, but could cure the disease altogether in more 
than 90 percent of individuals, by providing coverage of that medication 
 
4, 
https://epascorecard.covermymeds.com/images/FrostSullivanPrior%20AuthorizationWhitepaper
%20FINAL.pdf (last visited May 7, 2017). 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8 (2016). 
150. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2012). 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8.42(d)(4) (2016); 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2012). 
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2016); 42 C.F.R § 431.200 (2017); 
42 C.F.R § 431.221 (2017). 
153. B.E. & A.R. v. Teeter, No. C16-227-JCC, 2016 WL 3033500, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 
2016). 
154. Id. 
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to only enrollees who had a high fibrosis score (i.e., those whose disease 
had progressed to the point of liver damage severe enough to require a 
liver transplant).155  Pursuant to the WHCA’s restriction on this hepatitis 
C medication, the plaintiffs alleged that the WHCA’s prior authorization 
policies (1) excluded qualified Medicaid recipients from medically 
necessary treatment; (2) discriminated among similarly situated Medicaid 
recipients; and (3) failed to provide medically necessary treatment with 
reasonable promptness.156 
The plaintiffs argued that the medication was medically necessary 
regardless of a plan enrollee’s fibrosis score and unlimited access to it 
was consistent with the standard of care.  Pursuant to the Washington 
Administrative Code, the WHCA determines whether a service is 
medically necessary by rating the evidence of a service’s effectiveness 
and safety with a score from “A” to “D.”157  If the service receives a grade 
of “A” or “B,” then it must be approved so long as it does not subject the 
enrollee “to a greater risk of mortality or morbidity” and “is not more 
costly” when compared to an equally effective treatment.158  Though the 
WHCA gave the medication at issue an “A,” and conceded that there was 
no “equally effective treatment” available, the WHCA offered 
“monitoring” to enrollees without a high fibrosis score as the “equally 
effective treatment.”159  But the plaintiffs argued that monitoring alone 
was not equally effective because waiting until an enrollee’s liver is 
damaged before covering the medication is harmful to the enrollee’s 
health and significantly increases the risk of both morbidity and 
mortality.160 
The court found that the plaintiffs’ evidence would likely establish that 
the WHCA failed to follow its own definition of medical necessity by 
merely providing monitoring to certain individuals based on levels of 
liver damage in lieu of the highly effective medication.161  The court cited 
CMS’ 2015 Notice—“Assuring Medicaid Beneficiaries Access to 
Hepatitis C Drugs”—in which CMS expressed concern that some states, 
contrary to statutory requirements, restricted access to hepatitis C 
medications by imposing prior authorization coverage conditions that 
unreasonably restricted access to those drugs, such as limiting treatment 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 182-501-0165 (2017). 
158. Id. § 182-501-0165(6) (2017); Teeter, 2016 WL 3033500, at *2–3. 
159. Teeter, 2016 WL 3033500, at *3. 
160. Id. at *4–5. 
161. Id. at *3–5. 
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based on the extent of an enrollee’s liver damage.162  Ultimately, the court 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the 
plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction; they were likely to succeed on the merits of their case; a 
balancing of equities favored the plaintiffs over the state agency; and an 
injunction would be in the public interest.  The court noted that when 
faced with “a conflict between financial concerns and human suffering, 
[it had] little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips 
decidedly in the plaintiffs’ favor.”163  As such, the court enjoined the 
WHRC from continuing to apply its overly burdensome prior 
authorization policy and required the agency to provide coverage for 
prescription medications for hepatitis C without regard to the extent of 
liver damage.164 
2.  The Medicaid Act’s Reasonable Promptness Provision 
Prior authorization requirements that delay access to medically 
necessary prescription drugs may also violate the reasonable promptness 
provision of the Medicaid Act.165  In some instances, the delay results 
from a lack of established timelines to respond to prior authorization 
requests, giving the program leeway to take as long as it wants to provide 
an answer.  In the absence of a specific regulation requiring an established 
timeline, courts have approved decrees or imposed time limits for the 
processing of prior authorization requests for Medicaid-covered 
services.166 
For example, in Ladd v. Thomas, Medicaid recipients sued the 
Commissioner of the Connecticut State Department of Social Services 
(“DSS”) for violating the Federal Medicaid Act, including the reasonable 
 
162. Id.; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & CHIP SERVS., MEDICAID 
DRUG REBATE PROGRAM NOTICE: ASSURING MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES ACCESS TO HEPATITIS C 
DRUGS (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-
topics/prescription-drugs/downloads/rx-releases/state-releases/state-rel-172.pdf. 
163. Teeter, 2016 WL 3033500, at *6 (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
164. Other states, including Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, 
have taken measures to remove burdensome prior authorization processes for individuals with 
hepatitis C.  Judith Graham, Medicaid, Private Insurers Begin to Lift Curbs on Pricey Hepatitis C 
Drugs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 5, 2016), http://khn.org/news/medicaid-private-insurers-
begin-to-lift-curbs-on-pricey-hepatitis-c-drugs/; Jen Rini, State Changes Hep C Medication 
Guidelines, Avoids Lawsuit, NEWS J. (June 10, 2016, 10:53 AM), 
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/health/2016/06/07/state-changes-hep-c-medication-
guidelines-avoids-lawsuit/85554396/. 
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2016); see supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the reasonable 
promptness provision). 
166. Kirk T. v. Houstoun, No. 99-3253, 2000 WL 830731, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2000). 
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promptness provision.167 The state Medicaid regulations required prior 
authorization for all rentals of durable medical equipment (“DME”), 
regardless of cost; all replacement equipment and repairs; and any DME 
item over $100.168  The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to 
impose specific deadlines for the defendant to respond to prior 
authorization requests for DMEs.169  The court stated that Medicaid 
programs must use reasonable promptness in acting on prior 
authorization requests.  It noted that when a state agency fails to 
promulgate regulations that establish an express time to respond to prior 
authorization requests, courts are “uniquely suited to determining what is 
reasonable” under the Medicaid Act.170  The court then set a twenty-day-
turnaround time for such determinations, noting that the DSS’ suggestion 
of thirty days was unreasonable.171 
Similarly, in Smith v. Miller, Medicaid providers filed a class action 
suit against the director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid (“DPA”) 
alleging that the DPA had not processed prior authorization requests for 
specialized medical care promptly enough to satisfy the reasonable 
promptness provision.172  The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to 
establish fixed time limits.173  In finding that the failure to promulgate 
time limits and the resulting delays violated the reasonable promptness 
provision, the court enjoined the DPA to process such requests within ten 
to thirty days.  If the DPA failed to meet the thirty-day deadline to respond 
to a request, the court would deem the request automatically approved.174  
The court noted that the “prompt action by the [S]tate is crucial in the 
medical assistance program . . . because even retroactive payment may 
not be fully remedial for the delays and ‘delay beyond the time limits may 
. . . impose lingering, if not irreversible, hardships upon recipients.’”175  
Therefore, if an insurer fails to set a time limit in which it must respond 
or takes too long to respond to a prior authorization request, a Medicaid 
enrollee may be able to bring a case for violation of the reasonable 
promptness provision. 
 
167. Ladd v. Thomas, 141 F.Supp.2d 222, 223 (D. Conn. 1998). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 177 (7th Cir. 1981). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Kessler v. Blum, 591 F. Supp. 1013, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Smith, 665 F.2d at 177). 
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3.  The Medicare Act’s Part D Formulary Requirements 
Under the Medicare Act, CMS has the authority to issue enforcement 
actions against Medicare plan sponsors that impose overly restrictive 
prior authorization policies on enrollees.176  Each year, CMS reviews 
Medicare prescription drug plans and their proposed use of prior 
authorization processes to adjudicate Medicare prescription drug claims 
(“Part D claims”).177  While Medicare prescription drug plan sponsors 
are permitted to use prior authorization, pharmacy and therapeutic 
committees must develop and review such policies, and the sponsor must 
establish an exception process.178 
Failing to follow these requirements can result in civil money penalties 
and termination of contracts.179  For example, in November 2015, 
SilverScript Insurance Company failed to properly effectuate prior 
authorization and exception requests and applied unapproved prior 
authorization policies.180  As a result, enrollees experienced inappropriate 
denials of coverage at the point of sale and were delayed access to drugs, 
never received the drugs, or incurred increased out-of-pocket costs.181  In 
response, CMS imposed a $594,100 penalty on the insurance 
company.182 
Additionally, Medicare enrollees must have uninterrupted access to all 
or substantially all of the drugs in six drug classes that CMS has 
specifically designated.  Prescription drug plans are not permitted to 
require prior authorization policies for enrollees stabilized on drugs from 
these six protected classes, which include antidepressants, antipsychotics, 
anticonvulsants for seizures, antiretroviral for treatment of HIV, 
 
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27(c)(2) (2012) (incorporated into Medicare Part D by 42 U.S.C. § 
1395w-112(b)(3)(B)); 42 C.F.R. § 423.509(a) (2008); Part C and Part D Enforcement Actions, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Compliance-and-
Audits/Part-C-and-Part-D-Compliance-and-Audits/PartCandPartDEnforcementActions-.html (last 
visited May 8, 2017) [hereinafter Part C and Part D Enforcement]. 
177. See 42 C.F.R. § 423.272(b)(2) (2015) (stating plan designs); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL, CMS Pub.100-18, ch. 6, 
§ 30.2 (rev. 18 Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-
Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf 
(outlining the review and negotiation process of bids, and approval of plans submitted by potential 
Part D sponsors). 
178. 42 C.F.R. § 423.10(b)(x) (2015). 
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27I(2) (2010); Part C and Part D Enforcement, supra note 176. 
180. Letter from Gerard J. Mulcahy, Dir., Medicare Parts C & D Oversight & Enf’t Grp., to 
Todd Meek, President, SilverScript Ins. Co. (Nov, 20, 2015), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Compliance-and-Audits/Part-C-and-Part-D-Compliance-and-
Audits/Downloads/SilverScript_CMP_11_20_2015.pdf. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/2/2017  11:10 AM 
2017] Now or Never 1071 
antineoplastic for treatment of cancer, and immunosuppresses to prevent 
the rejection of transplants.183 
Enforcement actions can stem from an insurer’s failure to comply with 
CMS’ guidelines regarding drug formularies.  For example, in 2010, 
CMS terminated its contract with Fox Insurance Company (“Fox”) for 
imposing improper prior authorization protocols that resulted in 
imminent and serious risk to the health of enrollees.184  CMS found that 
Fox delayed and denied access to medically necessary drugs and 
therapies in protected classes, including HIV, cancer, and anti-seizure 
medications, and never obtained approval from CMS for the application 
of prior authorization criteria for these drugs.185 
Specifically, Fox inappropriately utilized “high-cost edits” (i.e., it 
flagged drugs in its systems simply because the drugs were expensive or 
exceeded a certain cost threshold).  Health plans can appropriately use 
high-cost edits to prevent inadvertent overbilling claims.  Pharmacists 
routinely resolve these edits at the pharmacy counter with no significant 
delays.  But Fox inappropriately utilized the edit when it notified the 
pharmacist that prior authorization requirements—requirements not 
approved by CMS—had not been met for formulary drugs.  Fox’s actions 
resulted in thousands of rejected claims.  Inappropriate denials for high-
cost drugs forced enrollees to make a decision whether to pay for their 
drugs out of pocket or forego the life-sustaining medication.  Given the 
low-income status of 90 percent of Fox’s enrollees, the option of paying 
out of pocket proved too cost prohibitive and thus, many enrollees had to 
leave pharmacies without their prescriptions. 
As a result, CMS terminated Fox’s Medicare Part D services contract 
and ordered Fox to immediately repay funds that the government paid to 
Fox during the month in which the contract was terminated.186  
Therefore, if a prescription drug plan uses prior authorization in an 
unapproved manner, resulting in inappropriate denials, CMS can take an 
enforcement action. 
4.  State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
Prior authorization policies may violate UDTP laws if determinations 
 
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(i) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(2)(v) (2015); CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL, CMS 
Pub.100-18, ch. 6, § 30.2.5 (rev. 18 Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-
Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf. 
184. Letter from Tranchida to Shankar, supra note 146. 
185. Id. 
186. Fox Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
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are made in a deceptive or misleading manner.  An insurer may engage 
in deceptive trade practices if its actual practices are contrary to those 
represented to consumers in plan documents.187  For example, if the 
insurer makes a medical necessity determination that is inconsistent with 
the definition of medical necessity in its own policy, such a determination 
may violate UTDP laws.188  Additionally, an insurer may also violate 
UTDP laws if it refuses to pay a claim without conducting a reasonable 
investigation of medical necessity or makes its decision based on cost 
alone.189  As the American Civil Liberties Union has stated in relation to 
a class action lawsuit against Indiana’s Medicaid program, “a medically 
necessary treatment is a medically necessary treatment, no matter what 
the cost.”190 
In April 2016, New York’s attorney general sued Capital District 
Physician’s Health Plan (“CDPHP”) for violating the State’s UDTP laws 
for unlawfully restricting coverage of treatment for individuals with 
hepatitis C.191  Similar to the WHCA in Teeter,192 CDPHP allegedly 
denied coverage for the treatment unless an enrollee could prove 
advanced liver damage, as diagnosed by a specialist rather than a primary 
care provider.  CDPHP also restricted coverage to individuals who could 
prove that they had not used drugs or alcohol within the past six months.  
Also, if the enrollee did not have liver scarring, the enrollee would have 
to wait until he or she developed liver scarring before the treatment would 
be covered. 
The attorney general stated that “forcing patients to wait for care, 
risking internal organ damage . . . violate[d] the law and the company’s 
own policies.”193  The attorney general further argued that such practice 
 
187. N.M. CODE R. § 13.10.17.7(L) (LexisNexis 2017); Rodarte v. Presbyterian Ins. Co., 371 
P.3d 1067 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). 
188. Complaint at 17–19, New York v. Capital Dist. Physicians’ Health Plan, Inc., No. 450471 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2016). 
189. Hunter v. Regence Blue Shield, No. 56638-5-I, 2006 WL 2396643, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Aug. 21, 2016) (referring to WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2017)). 
190. Michael Ollove, Are States Obligated to Provide Expensive Hepatitis C Drugs?, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR., (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/02/09/are-states-obligated-to-provide-expensive-hepatitis-c-drugs. 
191. Complaint at 2–3, Capital Dist. Physicians’ Health Plan, Inc., No. 450471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 14, 2016); Claire Hughes, AG Reaches Hepatitis C Agreement with 7 Insurers, but not 
CDPHP, TIMESUNION (Apr. 26, 2016, 11:08 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/AG-
reaches-hepatitis-C-agreement-with-7-insurers-7377599.php. 
192. B.E. & A.R. v. Teeter, No. C16-227-JCC, 2016 WL 3033500, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 
2016). 
193. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Lawsuit Accuses 
Health Insurer CDPHP of Unlawfully Denying Coverage of Hepatitis C. Treatment (Apr. 14, 2016), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-lawsuit-accuses-health-insurer-cdphp-
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violated New York’s UDTP law because CDPHP failed to disclose the 
role that cost plays in making medical necessity determinations.  He 
argued that the plan documents misled enrollees into believing that 
medically necessary care would be covered when, in fact, CDPHP 
refused to cover treatment for hepatitis C consistent with generally 
accepted standards of care, prevailing medical guidelines, and the FDA-
approved indications for the medications on the insurer’s formulary.194  
The complaint alleged that, rather than covering care for all enrollees for 
whom treatment was medically necessary, it only covered treatment for 
enrollees whose care was deemed most medically necessary.195  The 
attorney general and CDPHP settled weeks later.  CDPHP agreed to 
change its policy and no longer restricted coverage of certain hepatitis C 
treatments to individuals with the most severe symptoms.196  The insurer 
also stopped denying coverage based on individuals’ drug or alcohol use, 
and began to allow treatment authorization from any trained provider (not 
just a liver specialist).197 
5.  State Common Law Claim for Insurance Bad Faith 
An individual may be able to bring a common law claim for insurance 
bad faith if an insurer implements an overly burdensome prior 
authorization policy.  The tort of insurance bad faith arises out of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and applies when an 
insurer denies or refuses to settle a claim within policy limits.198  To 
recover under a common law claim of bad faith, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits 
under the policy and that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded its 
lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.199  For example, an 
individual may be able to bring a claim for bad faith if the insurer denied 
his or her claim by interpreting “medical necessity” in a manner that is 
 
unlawfully-denying-coverage. 
194. Complaint at 18, Capital Dist. Physicians’ Health Plan, Inc., No. 450471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 14, 2016). 
195. Id. 
196. Hughes, supra note 191. 
197. Id. 
198. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Wis. 1978) (discussing that 
there only needs to be a showing of “knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable 
basis for denying or refusing to honor or negotiate on an insured’s claim”); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 
426 P.2d 173, 176–77 (Cal. 1967) (demonstrating instances where courts held against the insurer 
for breach of implied covenant of good faith). 
199. E.g., Prod. Source Int’l, LLC v. Foremost Signature Ins. Co., 195 F.Supp.3d 660 (D.N.J. 
2016); Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (explaining 
the common law burden that the plaintiff must reach to be successful on a claim of bad faith). 
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inconsistent with the standard of care, by denying coverage for a 
treatment based on the insurer’s desire to decrease costs and increase 
profits, or unduly delaying payment for treatment.200 
The plaintiff may also have to prove that the insurer was motivated by 
self-interest or ill will.201  An insurer cannot shield itself from bad-faith 
liability by merely investigating a claim in a manner calculated to 
construct a pretextual basis for denying a claim.202  As part of its common 
law duty, an insurer has an obligation to conduct an adequate 
investigation before denying a claim.203  Moreover, if the insurer’s 
conduct is part of a pattern or practice of bad-faith behavior toward its 
enrollees, a court may award punitive damages.204 
Other states have codified bad faith causes of action, and therefore, 
may not recognize common law actions for bad faith.205  For example, 
under Colorado law, “a person engaged in the business of insurance shall 
not unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim for benefits owed to 
or on behalf of any first-party claimant.”206  Likewise, Montana’s unfair 
claim settlement practices statute provides that an insurer may not 
conduct the following activities as part of its general business practice: 
(1) misrepresent pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to 
coverages; (2) fail to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly in 
response to claim communications; (3) refuse to pay claims without 
conducting a reasonable investigation; (4) fail to make good faith 
attempts for prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims if liability 
 
200. Complaint, Pieper v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., No. 0:16-cv-00687 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2016); 
see, e.g., McEvoy by Finn v. Grp. Health Co-op. of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997) 
(explaining that, given health maintenance organization (“HMO”) subscribers’ inferior position for 
enforcing their contractual health care rights, the application of the tort of bad faith is an additional 
means of ensuring that HMOs do not give cost containment and utilization review such significant 
weight so as to disregard the legitimate medical needs of subscribers). 
201. Andrews v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-5147, 2016 WL 3690091, at *4 (D.N.J. July 12, 
2016). 
202. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 265 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 381 
S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2012); United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Croft, 175 S.W.3d 457, 469–70 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
203. Ruttiger, 265 S.W.3d at 661. 
204. E.g., Mock v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 554 Cal.App.4th 306 (2d Dist. 1992) (showing 
that a court can award punitive damages if a pattern of bad faith toward an insurer’s enrollees is 
proven). 
205. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas., 611 P.2d 149, 151–52 (Kan. 1980); see generally 
Rossman v. GFG Corp. of Mo., 596 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing different states’ 
approaches to bad faith causes of actions). 
206. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1115 (2008); Wilson v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., No. 14-cv-
03259, 2015 WL 849210, at *5 (D. Colo. 2015).  These laws are sometimes referred to as “prompt 
payment” laws. 
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is reasonably clear; or (5) force enrollees to institute litigation to obtain 
reimbursement by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately 
recovered in actions brought by the enrollees.207 
An insurer’s delay or denial is unreasonable “if the insurer delayed or 
denied authorizing payment of a covered benefit without a reasonable 
basis for that action.”208  In McEvoy v. Group Health Cooperative of Eau 
Claire, a Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) refused to 
authorize more than six weeks of inpatient treatment for a thirteen-year-
old girl with anorexia despite recommendations from the girl’s physicians 
that she needed to remain in treatment longer.209  Even though the girl 
had not met her treatment goals, the HMO would only authorize a weekly 
outpatient group therapy session, not an inpatient treatment.  Though 
plaintiffs typically bring a claim for bad faith against traditional insurers, 
the court permitted the plaintiff in McEvoy to bring the claim against her 
HMO.210  The court noted that the “application of the tort of bad faith is 
an additional means of ensuring that HMOs do not give cost containment 
and utilization review such significant weight so as to disregard the 
legitimate medical needs of subscribers.”211  The court noted that the 
HMO denied reimbursement without establishing a reasonable basis.  
While the court stated that reasonably debatable claims were not subject 
to bad faith claims, it refused to find that the HMO was not required to 
pay for the plaintiff’s extended care simply because the contract required 
the HMO’s prior authorization for the expenditure.212  It noted that 
“[s]uch unilateral authority would give [the HMO] the sole power to 
determine when and to what extent it would be bound to its subscriber 
contracts.”213  The court, therefore, held that 
[w]here an HMO authorizes a referral to an out-of-network provider, 
the HMO may not end that referral against the recommendation of the 
treating physicians solely on the basis of cost-containment concerns 
when the subscriber has not reached the contractual coverage limits.  
Thus, such an improper denial can constitute a bad faith denial.214 
Therefore, enrollees may be able to bring a claim for bad faith for 
burdensome or abusive prior authorization policies if such policies are 
 
207. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (2015). 
208. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1115 (2008); Wilson, 2015 WL 849210, at *5. 
209. McEvoy by Finn v. Grp. Health Co-op of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397, 400–01 (Wis. 
1997). 
210. Id. at 405. 
211. Id. at 403. 
212. Id. at 404–05. 
213. Id. at 404. 
214. Id. at 404. 
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misleading, result in undue delay in payment, are inconsistent with 
standards of care, or are based on cost containment alone. 
E.  Network Adequacy 
Network adequacy “refers to a health plan’s ability to deliver the 
benefits promised by providing reasonable access to a sufficient number 
of in-network primary care and specialty physicians, as well as all health 
care services included under the terms of the contract.”215  For a network 
to be considered adequate, it must offer access to adequate care, at the 
appropriate time, and without requiring an unreasonable amount of 
travel.216  By contrast, inadequate networks often result in individuals 
forgoing treatment or paying large sums out of pocket to see more 
conveniently located out-of-network providers.217  Overly “narrow 
network” schemes designed to limit access to quality health care 
providers are increasingly restricting access to quality health care.218  For 
example, if a network has an insufficient number of in-network providers, 
the plan enrollee may be forced to see an out-of-network provider. 
Moreover, while the ACA limits out-of-pocket costs for the 2017 plan 
year to $7,150 for individuals and $14,300 for families, these limits do 
not apply to any services provided by an out-of-network provider.219  
Therefore, if an individual were to obtain treatment from an out-of-
network provider at an in-network hospital, he or she may receive a 
surprise medical bill—an occurrence that one in five individuals who visit 
the emergency department have faced.220 
1.  Federal Claim Based on the ACA’s Network Adequacy Standards 
The ACA established network adequacy standards for QHPs, which 
gave lawmakers and policymakers a vehicle for ensuring standards are 
met and consumer needs are addressed.221  ACA regulations require plans 
to ensure that their networks include essential community providers and 
 
215. Network Adequacy, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_network_adequacy.htm. 
216. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230 (2012). 
217. Network Adequacy, supra note 215. 
218. Id. 
219. Matthew Rae et al., Patient Cost-Sharing in Marketplace Plans, 2016, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/patient-cost-sharing-in-
marketplace-plans-2016/. 
220. Dan Mangan, Many Get Hit with Surprise ‘Out-of-Network’ Bill After Emergency Rooms: 
Study, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/16/many-get-hit-with-
surprise-out-of-network-bill-after-emergency-rooms-study.html. 
221. Network Adequacy, supra note 215. 
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maintain sufficient numbers and types of providers.222  Insurers offering 
QHPs must publish up-to-date, accurate, and complete provider 
directories online.223  The general public must be able to view all current 
providers for a plan in the provider directory on the plan issuer’s public 
website through a clearly identifiable link or tab.224  If an insurer or self-
funded nonfederal governmental group plan fails to meet the ACA’s 
network adequacy requirements, an individual can file a complaint with 
the State under the Public Health Services Act.225  Given the recent 
enactment of the ACA and this requirement, no complaints appear to be 
filed alleging ACA violations for narrow networks as of yet, but if an 
insurer were to fail to meet the network adequacy requirements under the 
ACA, filing a complaint is an option. 
2.  CMS’ Transparency Rule 
Failure to provide accurate network directories may violate CMS rules.  
As of 2016, CMS requires Medicare Advantage Organizations 
(“MAOs”), public or private organizations that states license to provide 
services to Medicare beneficiaries, to communicate at least every three 
months with providers to ascertain their availability and whether they are 
accepting new patients.226  CMS also expects MAOs to update their 
online provider directories in real time and provide complete information 
on all active contracted providers, including notations highlighting 
providers who are closed or not accepting new patients.227  In a separate 
rule, CMS requires insurers to provide online and to update monthly 
 
222. Id.  An “essential community provider” is a provider that serves predominantly low-
income, medically underserved individuals, including a health care provider; a state-owned family 
planning service site; governmental family planning service site; or not-for-profit family planning 
service site that does not receive federal funding under special programs. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. The Public Health Services Act contemplates the states as being the primary enforcers of 
the ACA’s private health insurance market reforms.  But if the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) determines that a state has failed to 
substantially enforce a provision, including the ACA’s network adequacy requirements, HHS may 
take enforcement action and impose civil penalties.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(2), (b)(2) (2012); 
Jennifer Staman, Enforcement of Private Health Insurance Market Reforms Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), CONG. RES. SERVS. 1, 5 (Feb. 7, 2011). 
226. Brian Eastwood, CMS Tighten Provider Directory Rules for 2016, FIERCE HEALTHCARE 
(Mar. 9, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/cms-tightens-provider-
directory-rules-for-2016. 
227. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ADVANCE NOTICE OF METHODOLOGICAL 
CHANGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR (CY) 2016 FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (MA) CAPITATION 
RATES, PART C AND PART D PAYMENT POLICIES AND 2016 CALL LETTER (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-
Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2016.pdf. 
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directories for QHPs sold in federally facilitated marketplaces.228  MAOs 
providing inaccurate directories face a penalty fine of up to $25,000 per 
day per enrollee or restrictions on new enrollment and marketing.229  
Plans sold on the federal exchange face penalties of up to $100 a day per 
affected enrollee for deficient directories.230  It appears that no 
enforcement actions have been taken yet pursuant to violations of these 
transparency rules. 
3.  State Claim Based on Network Adequacy Laws 
Narrow networks may also violate state network adequacy laws.  State 
approaches to regulating network adequacy vary widely, due in part to a 
state’s need to “maintain robust health insurance markets by balancing 
access needs with the goals of controlling costs and attracting a healthy 
number of insurers.”231  For example, in some states, network adequacy 
rules may only apply to certain subsets of plans.232  Furthermore, while 
some states do not use quantitative standards to measure adequacy, a 
majority of states have at least one quantitative standard (e.g., standards 
related to maximum travel time or distance, provider-to-enrollee ratios, 
maximum appointment waiting times, and hours of operation).233  State 
regulations also differ on whether regulators have the authority to conduct 
ongoing oversite investigations.234 
In California, network adequacy regulations require insurers offering 
individual health or group disability insurance to ensure that “network 
providers . . . are sufficient in number, capacity, and specialty to be 
capable of furnishing the health care services covered by the insurance 
contract, taking into account the number of covered persons, their 
 
228. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FINAL 2016 LETTER TO ISSUERS IN THE 
FEDERALLY-FACILITATED MARKETPLACES (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Downloads/2016_Letter_to_Issuers_2_20_2015.pdf. 
229. Susan Jaffe, Obamacare, Private Medicare Plans Must Keep Updated Doctor Directories 
in 2016, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), http://khn.org/news/health-exchange-medicare-
advantage-plans-must-keep-updated-doctor-directories-in-2016/. 
230. Id. 
231. Sally McCarty & Max Farris, ACA Implications for State Network Adequacy Standards, 
STATE HEALTH REFORM ASSISTANCE NETWORK, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 1, 1 (Aug. 
2013), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/rwjf407486. 
232. Justin Giovannelli, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Regulation of 
Marketplace Plan Provider Networks, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 5, 2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/may/state-regulation-of-
marketplace-plan-provider-networks. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
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characteristics and medical needs.”235 
The regulations also incorporate quantitative adequacy measures.  
These measures may include having a particular number of full-time 
physicians, including primary care physicians, per enrollees; a sufficient 
number of primary care providers, mental health professionals, and 
network hospitals within thirty minutes of an enrollee’s residence or 
workplace; and a sufficient number of specialists accepting new patients 
within sixty minutes of an enrollee’s residence or workplace.236  Other 
regulations include standards on hours of operation237 and several 
quantitative and nonquantitative standards related to appointment waiting 
times.238 
The California Department of Insurance is responsible for oversight 
and enforcement of the regulations cited above.239  Consumers may 
reference their state’s network adequacy laws and regulations or consult 
their state’s insurance department for more information.  If a consumer 
believes that an insurer is in violation of a network adequacy standard, 
the consumer may file a complaint with his or her state’s insurance 
department.  But while network adequacy laws and regulations exist, 
courts tend to favor the defendant.240 
4.  State Breach of Contract Claim 
If a Medicare Advantage (“MA”) insurance provider terminates its 
contract with health care providers midyear, such a bait-and-switch tactic 
to narrow the network can result in a breach of contract claim.  For 
example, in Fairfield County Medical Association v. United Healthcare 
of New England, two professional organizations sued United Healthcare 
(“United”) on behalf of approximately 2,200 physicians that United 
terminated “without cause” from its MA program.241  United sent the 
physicians a letter notifying them that they would be removed from 
United’s MA network in approximately three months.242  The insurer 
characterized the change as an “amendment” to its contract with the 
 
235. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2240.1(b)(1) (2017). 
236. Id. § 2240.1(c). 
237. Id. § 2240.15. 
238. Id. § 2240.1(b)(4). 
239. The 12921 California Department of Managed Health Care enforces separate network 
adequacy laws related to HMOs and preferred provider organizations (“PPOs”). 
240. E.g., Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 424 
(6th Cir. 2013); Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 139 A.3d 134 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2016). 
241. 985 F.Supp.2d 262, 266 (D. Conn. 2013). 
242. Id. 
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physicians.243  The physicians argued that United’s actions constituted a 
breach of contract and sought an injunction to prevent the unilateral 
termination.244 
The court held that United’s argument that it had a unilateral right to 
terminate participating providers from the MA plan by an “amendment” 
of that plan is not supported by the language of the contract or the parties’ 
experience under it.245  Furthermore, it held that the providers who were 
subject to the termination notices would suffer irreparable harm due to 
“(1) disruption of their relationships with their Medicare Advantage 
patients, (2) loss of goodwill and reputational harm, and (3) a resulting 
loss of ability to compete in the market for provision of Medicare 
services.”246  The court found that even if the providers were to prevail 
on their claim against the insurer, it was unlikely that the former patients 
would return to the providers once they rejoined the network because 
most patients would have found other providers in the meantime.247  
Therefore, the court granted the providers a preliminary injunction 
preventing United from removing the affected physicians from its MA 
network based on their breach of contact claim.248 
5.  State Claim Pursuant to Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Laws 
Narrow network schemes may violate state UDTP laws.  For example, 
California’s CLRA prohibits any person from committing certain “unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in a 
transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods 
or services to any consumer.”249  The California statute instructs courts 
to liberally construe and apply its underlying purpose (i.e., “to protect 
consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide 
efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection”).250  
Prohibited practices include (1) representing that services have approval, 
characteristics, uses, or benefits that they do not have;251 (2) advertising 
services with the intent not to sell them as advertised;252 (3) representing 
that a transaction confers or involves certain rights, remedies, or 
 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a) (West 2017). 
250. Id. § 1760. 
251. Id. § 1770(a)(5). 
252. Id. § 1770(a)(9). 
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obligations which it does not have;253 and (4) inserting an unconscionable 
term in a contract.254 
Similarly, the UCL is designed to protect consumers and business 
competitors from unfair business practices.  The UCL contains a general, 
broad prohibition against unfair competition, which is defined as 
including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”255 
In July 2014, a California class of plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Blue 
Cross of California alleging that the insurer canceled all of its existing 
non-ACA-compliant health plans and only made available new ACA-
compliant plans.256  According to the complaint, Blue Cross marketed 
and represented its new plans as having specific in-network physicians 
and hospitals, and then reduced these networks during the open 
enrollment period.  Consumers did not discover that the networks did not 
include the providers that Blue Cross represented as “in-network” until 
after they were already enrolled in the new plans. 
The plaintiffs and class members alleged that “Blue Cross’s bait-and-
switch tactics of representing and advertising that its [health plans had] 
certain providers in the plans’ networks when those providers [were] not 
actually in the plans’ networks” violated the CLRA.257  Specifically, they 
alleged that Blue Cross (1) represented that the health plans had provider 
network characteristics that they did not have; (2) advertised health plans 
as having provider network characteristics with the intent not to sell them 
as advertised; (3) represented that a transaction conferred certain provider 
network rights, remedies, or obligations which they did not have; and (4) 
adopted “unconscionable contract provisions requiring undisclosed 
higher deductible limits for out-of-network providers, adopting 
inadequate provider networks, and concealing material terms of the 
coverage.”258 
The complaint also contained allegations that Blue Cross violated the 
UCL because Blue Cross’s actions were unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent 
business practices.259  Although Blue Cross did not admit to any 
wrongdoing, it settled the case, along with three other class action suits 
against it, in March 2016.260  Blue Cross agreed to reimburse class 
 
253. Id. § 1770(a)(14). 
254. Id. § 1770(a)(19). 
255. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017). 
256. Complaint at 2, Felser v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. BC550739 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
July 8, 2014). 
257. Id. at 5. 
258. Id. at 3–4. 
259. Id. at 5. 
260. Amended Class Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, Felser, No. BC550739 (Cal. App. 
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members for all of their out-of-pocket expenses for the period at issue, 
with an estimated aggregate total of approximately $15 million. 
F.  Clinical Pathways Programs 
Clinical pathways are “multidisciplinary care plans that provide 
specific guidance on the sequencing of care steps and the timeline of 
interventions” to influence practitioners’ treatment decisions.261  When 
an independent panel with proper medical or scientific training creates 
clinical pathways, they may be an appropriate tool to guide a physician’s 
treatment decisions.  But insurers use their own, internally developed 
clinical pathways to steer providers toward their preferred sequence of 
treatment by offering them a financial incentive or disincentive.262  For 
example, WellPoint offers oncologists monthly payments of $350 for 
each patient treated in compliance with the insurer’s recommended 
treatment pathways.263  A recent survey of managed care insurers showed 
that 46 percent of network physicians are provided with financial 
incentives to follow the pathways, 38 percent are encouraged but not 
incentivized, and 23 percent are required to follow the pathways to 
remain in the plan’s network.264 
The growing use of financial incentives to encourage the promotion of 
certain treatments over others is unethical and creates a conflict of 
interest.  Practicing physicians have a moral obligation to use sound, 
professional judgment when making treatment decisions.  Physicians 
must recommend treatments that are best suited for their patients, and not 
those that would provide them with greatest financial gain. 
Clinical pathways also limit patient access to new and effective 
treatments and technologies, discourage personalized care, are not 
suitable for unusual or unpredicted conditions, and do not respond to 
unexpected changes to an individual’s condition.265  Instead, clinical 
pathways are designed to align treatment protocols with insurers’ 
 
Dep’t Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2016). 
261. AVALERE HEALTH LLC, CLINICAL PATHWAYS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND 
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PATIENTS, PAYERS, AND PROVIDERS 4 (2015). 
262. Id. at 10.  Hereinafter, please note that “clinical pathways” refers to insurer-driven clinical 
pathways, and not those that are developed by medical and scientific experts, hereinafter.  Id. at 6. 
263. Anna Wilde Mathews, Insurers Push to Rein in Spending on Cancer Care, WALL STREET 
J. (May 27, 2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/insurer-to-reward-cancer-doctors-for-
adhering-to-regimens-1401220033. 
264. Clinical Pathways: An Evolutionary Approach to Cancer Care, ONELIVE (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.onclive.com/publications/oncology-business-news/2013/april-2013/clinical-
pathways-an-evolutionary-approach-to-cancer-care/1. 
265. Clinical Pathways: Multidisciplinary Plans of Best Clinical Practice, OPEN CLINICAL, 
http://www.openclinical.org/clinicalpathways.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
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interests (i.e., cost reduction).266 
1.  State Medical Practice Acts 
Clinical pathways may cause health care practitioners to violate state 
medical practice acts.  All fifty states have enacted medical practice acts, 
which set out the structure and responsibilities of a state’s medical 
board.267  State statutes and regulations define unethical conduct and 
authorize a state’s medical board to receive complaints, perform 
investigations, and discipline medical professionals for committing acts 
prohibited by the statute.268  If deemed to be in violation of the law, some 
states permit the state medical board to revoke a physician’s license to 
practice medicine, place a physician on probation, or impose any other 
sanctions authorized by the law.269 
Nevada’s medical practice act (“Nevada Act”), for example, provides 
at least four grounds by which a physician could be disciplined for 
following an insurer’s incentive-based pathway.  First, the Nevada Act 
states that the medical board may initiate disciplinary action or deny a 
license if a physician engages in conduct “that violates the trust of a 
patient and exploits the relationship between the physician and the patient 
for financial or other personal gain.”270  By accepting an incentive from 
an insurer for administering care according to the insurer’s pathway, the 
physician exploits the physician-patient relationship for financial gain 
where the patient would be better served under an alternative treatment 
regimen. 
Second, physicians are subject to discipline when they receive from 
“any person, corporation or other business organization any fee, 
commission, rebate or other form of compensation which is intended or 
tends to influence the physician’s objective evaluation or treatment of a 
patient.”271  Under an incentive-based clinical pathway program, the 
physician receives, and the insurer pays, a cash incentive for which the 
insurer intends to influence the physician to care for a patient according 
to the insurer’s cost-based pathway.  Therefore, this program provides a 
prohibited reward to influence a physician’s views and treatment 
 
266. Roxanne Nelson, WellPoint Offers Oncologists Incentives to Follow Pathways, 
MEDSCAPE MED (June 12, 2014), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/826681. 
267. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS, U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 6 
(2016). 
268. Id. 
269. Investigations Division—Frequently Asked Questions, NEV. STATE BOARD MED. 
EXAMINERS, http://medboard.nv.gov/Resources/FAQs/Investigations_Division/ (last visited Apr. 
26, 2017). 
270. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.301(7) (2016). 
271. Id. § 630.305(1)(a). 
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decisions. 
Third, the Nevada Act allows the medical board to discipline 
physicians who fail to disclose to a patient any conflicts of interest.  
Clinical pathway programs could create a conflict of interest when an 
insurer provides an incentive to a physician as a way to influence the 
physician’s patient-care decisions.  Therefore, if physicians fail to notify 
their patients of such conflict, they could be subjected to discipline. 
Finally, the Nevada Act authorizes the state medical board to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings where a physician “engages in conduct that 
brings the medical profession into disrepute.”272  Given that clinical 
pathway practices create conflicts of interest, they have the potential to 
affect a physician’s objective medical judgment and violate patients’ 
trust.  Therefore, a state medical board could potentially bring a 
disciplinary action here if it could prove that these programs negatively 
tainted the reputation of the medical profession. 
2.  State Commercial Bribery Statutes 
Commercial bribery is generally understood as giving, or offering to 
give, something of value with the intent to influence a relation between 
commercial parties.273  Generally, laws prohibiting commercial bribery 
are based upon agency principles regarding the impropriety of 
influencing an agent to breach a duty it owes to a principal.274  But the 
formulation of commercial bribery statutes varies from state to state, 
differing in degrees of culpability, levels of intent or knowledge required, 
and the relationship among the parties involved.275  Despite these 
variations, many commercial bribery statutes are arguably broad enough 
to encompass an insurer’s offer of incentives as a means of influencing a 
physician to follow the insurer’s clinical pathway. 
Connecticut’s law is representative of states with broad commercial 
bribery statutes.276  In Connecticut, an offeror violates the statute where 
he or she “confers, or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, 
agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter’s employer or 
principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s 
 
272. Id. § 630.301(9). 
273. James G. Park, Extraterritorial Impact of United States Antitrust Laws and Commercial 
Bribery Consideration, 1 DICKINSON INT’L L. ANN. 105, 119 (1982); Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent 
Developments in Foreign and Domestic Criminal Commercial Bribery Laws, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 151, 163. 
274. Rohlfsen, supra note 273, at 151. 
275. Id. at 163. 
276. Illinois, New York, Kentucky, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Alabama also have laws 
with similar language.  Id. at 165, 172, 174, 185. 
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or principal’s affairs.”277  An employee, agent, or fiduciary who receives 
such a benefit violates the statute when, “without the consent of his 
employer or principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit 
from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such 
benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s or 
principal’s affairs.”278 
It is not uncommon for states to pursue claims against health care 
professionals under commercial bribery laws.  In June 2015, five doctors 
were indicted in New Jersey for commercial bribery for referring patients 
to a medical imaging center in exchange for cash and other kickbacks.279  
Discussing the indictment, acting Attorney General Hoffman said, “[a] 
doctor’s duty is to his patients’ care and well-being, not to his personal 
wealth.  By allegedly selling their medical opinion for kickbacks, the five 
medical practitioners indicted today have abandoned that duty, thus 
breaking the law and the trust of those who sought their advice.”280 
An insurer offering incentives to a physician under a clinical pathway 
arrangement is no different than the owner of a medical imaging center 
who offers incentives for referrals.  In both instances, an offer of cash is 
made, without the patient’s consent, and with intent to influence the 
physician’s conduct in relation to the patient’s affairs.  Under the plain 
language of a Connecticut’s commercial bribery statute, the insurer (i.e., 
the offeror of the benefit), would fall within the reach of the statute. 
Pursuant to the New Jersey indictment, physicians participating in a 
kickback scheme fall within the reach of state commercial bribery 
statutes.  But it is unclear whether a physician participating in a clinical 
pathways arrangement violates a state commercial bribery statute.  Under 
such arrangement, the physician, as the patient’s fiduciary,281 accepts a 
cash incentive from the insurer without the patient’s consent.  Therefore, 
the clinical pathways arrangement violates the statute if a plaintiff can 
show that the physician accepted the incentive knowing the benefit would 
influence him or her to follow the insurer’s lower-cost treatment pathway. 
 
277. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-160 (2015). 
278. Id. § 53a-161. 
279. Five Medical Practitioners Indicted for Taking Bribes in Exchange for Referring Patients 
to Medical Imaging Centers Run by Criminal Enterprise, STATE N.J. DEP’T L. & PUB. SAFETY, 
OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (June 3, 2015), http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases15/pr20150603a.html. 
280. Id. 
281. Courts have long recognized that a physician is a fiduciary to his or her patients.  See, e.g., 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that a doctor-patient relationship 
has “fiducial qualities”); United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting 
that the “elements of a fiduciary relationship” exist in doctor-patient relationship); Stafford v. 
Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1954) (finding a doctor-patient fiduciary relationship). 
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A physician may argue in defense that he or she did not know the 
benefit would influence his or her decision.  But one study analyzing the 
dynamics between physicians and prescription drug representatives 
concluded that, even though physicians recognized the conflict of interest 
and understood the concept in general, the relationship with the drug 
representative created psychological dynamics that influenced 
physicians’ reasoning.282  Another recent study revealed that payments 
received from the medical industry affect doctors’ prescribing 
practices.283  According to the study, on average, doctors who receive 
payments from an interested party prescribe drugs differently than 
doctors who do not accept payments.284  For example, the more money a 
doctor receives, the more brand-name medications he or she tends to 
prescribe.285  The same principles apply when the insurer offers 
incentives to the provider.  Therefore, a physician may be indicted under 
a state commercial bribery statute for accepting incentives to follow an 
insurer’s clinical pathway. 
3.  State Ethics 
Clinical pathways may also violate ethical standards for which many 
prescribers take an oath to uphold.  For example, the American Medical 
Association (“AMA”) first adopted its code of medical ethics (“Code”) 
in 1847 in an effort to establish uniform standards for professional 
education, training, and conduct.286  Nearly 170 years later, the ever-
evolving Code is still the authoritative ethics guide for practicing 
physicians, reflecting the profession’s core values and how they apply in 
day-to-day practice.287  The Code covers a wide range of topics, 
including the physician-patient relationship, conflicts of interest, and 
gifts from members of the health care industry. 
While the AMA is a voluntary organization, and therefore, prescribers 
are not legally required to comply with the Code,288 a violation of the 
 
282. Susan Chimonas et al., Physicians and Drug Representatives: Exploring the Dynamics of 
the Relationship, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 184, 189 (2007). 
283. Charles Ornstein et al., Drug-Company Payments Mirror Doctors’ Brand-Name 
Prescribing, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-company-payments-mirror-doctors-brand-name-prescribing. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. AMA History, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-history (last visited Apr. 
17, 2016). 
287. Id. 
288. AM. MED. ASS’N, Preamble, Principles of Medical Ethics, in ASS’N, AMA CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS 1, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/principles-of-
medical-ethics.pdf (last updated June 2001). 
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Code can have significant consequences at the state level.  For example, 
Kentucky’s medical practice act incorporates the Code by reference and 
provides that the State’s board of medical licensure may deny an 
application or reregistration for a medical license; place a licensee on 
probation; suspend a license; limit or restrict a license for an indefinite 
period; or revoke any license issued by the board, upon proof that the 
licensee has “[e]ngaged in dishonorable, unethical, or unprofessional 
conduct of a character likely to deceive, defraud, or harm the public or 
any member thereof.”289  “Unethical conduct” includes a failure to 
conform to the principles of medical ethics of the AMA.290  Therefore, a 
violation of the Code may have serious disciplinary repercussions at the 
state level, including losing the license to practice medicine. 
The Code describes the physician-patient relationship as one based on 
trust, “giving rise to the physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ 
welfare above their own self-interest and above obligations to other 
groups, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.”291  This basic tenet 
is the foundation for several sections of the Code dedicated to conflicts 
of interest, which require physicians to avoid such conflicts and to resolve 
any conflicts that may arise to the patient’s benefit.292  Furthermore, a 
physician must avoid conflicts of interest to satisfy the guidelines related 
to a patient’s right to informed consent, whereby the physician “has an 
ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the 
therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice.”293 
The Code’s guidelines on gifts from pharmaceutical, biotechnology, 
and medical device companies adequately illustrate these principles.  Due 
to concerns that these gifts can create conditions that may bias, or be 
perceived to bias, a physician’s professional judgement in caring for 
patients, the Code states that, to “preserve the trust that is fundamental to 
the physician-patient relationship and public confidence in the 
profession, physicians should . . . decline cash gifts in any amount from 
 
289. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.595(9) (2017). 
290. Id. § 311.597. 
291. AM. MED. ASS’N, The Physician-Patient Relationship, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS 1.1.1 (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-
medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf. 
292. AM. MED. ASS’N, Opinions on Financing & Delivery of Health Care, in AMA CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINIONS ON FINANCING & DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE 5 (2016), 
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-
2.pdf. 
293. AM. MED. ASS’N, Informed Consent, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINIONS ON 
CONSENT, COMMUNICATION & DECISION MAKING 2 (2016), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-2.pdf. 
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an entity that has a direct interest in physicians’ treatment 
recommendations.”294 
While the Code does not have specific guidelines on incentives from 
insurance companies, incentive-based clinical pathways similarly create 
a conflict of interest that may directly violate the Code’s guidelines on 
the physician-patient relationship and avoiding conflicts of interest.  By 
giving physicians incentives to follow the insurer’s pathway, the 
physician is forced to decide between the insurer’s cost-saving pathway 
and a treatment plan that may be better suited for a specific patient’s 
health care needs.  If the physician follows the insurer’s pathway instead 
of choosing a treatment most suitable for the patient’s individual needs, 
then the physician may violate the Code by failing to resolve the conflict 
in favor of the patient.  Therefore, to avoid conflicts of interest and 
preserve the trust that is fundamental to the physician-patient 
relationship, physicians should decline cash incentives from insurers just 
as they should decline cash gifts from other participants in the health care 
industry. 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Health care must be patient centered.  Physicians need the autonomy 
to independently consider a patient’s unique circumstances, recommend 
a course of treatment that is most appropriate for the patient, and have 
confidence that the patient will receive that prescribed medication.  
Consumers must be empowered to bring lawsuits or file complaints so 
that they not only obtain remedies for any sustained wrongdoing derived 
from the lack of treatment access, but also to serve as a powerful deterrent 
for bad actors in the insurance industry. 
Additionally, where piecemeal lawsuits and investigations prove to be 
an insufficient deterrent to systematically prevent insurers from blocking 
access to care, lawmakers must take action to limit each of the specific 
insurance practices that interfere with the physician-patient relationship.  
While some states have already passed consumer-protection legislation 
addressing some of the unfair business practices discussed above, many 
states have yet to do so.  These laws must contain key provisions with 
strong language to ensure their effectiveness.  Furthermore, current and 
future laws need to be enforced and, in some cases, state lawmakers need 
to increase the enforcement authority of their state’s insurance 
commissioners and attorneys general. 
 
294. AM. MED. ASS’N, Gifts to Physicians from Industry, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: 
OPINIONS ON FINANCING & DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE 9 (2016), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-9.pdf. 
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A.  Empowering Consumers to Take Action 
In addition to strong enforcement by state and federal regulators, 
educating, empowering, and encouraging consumers to take action would 
help create disincentives for insurers to continue to implement unfair and 
discriminatory policies.  If an insurer uses a benefit utilization 
management policy in a discriminatory manner, enrollees have several 
options at their disposal that they can use to protect and enforce their 
rights. 
The first step is to appeal an adverse benefit determination.  The ACA 
requires insurers to strictly follow specific rules prior to rendering 
adverse benefit determinations.295  For instance, the insurer must ensure 
that all claims and appeals are adjudicated in a manner designed to ensure 
the independence and impartiality of the persons involved in making the 
decision.296  The insurer may not reduce or terminate an ongoing course 
of treatment without providing advance notice and an opportunity for 
advance review.297  As such, if coverage has been denied, the enrollee 
should request a copy of the denial letter explaining the reason for any 
denial of reimbursement or payment and disclosure of the criteria for 
medical necessity determinations.  He or she should then file an internal 
appeal in which his insurance company conducts its own full and fair 
review of its decision.298  It is important to note that the ACA and its 
interim final regulations require an insurer to provide continued coverage 
pending the outcome of an internal appeal.299 
If the internal appeal is unsuccessful, the enrollee may then request an 
external review in which an independent third party reviews the 
decision.300  It may be necessary to seek the assistance of a patient 
advocacy group or a state’s consumer assistance program with the appeal 
process, some of which provide services free of charge.  If the external 
 
295. Complaint at 38–39, N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., 980 F. 
Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 CV 1599). 
296. Id. at 72 (citing Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Issuers Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,333 (July 23, 2010)). 
297. Complaint at 283, UnitedHealth Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 527. 
298. All plans must implement an effective internal appeals process of coverage determinations 
and claims and comply with any applicable state external review process.  26 C.F.R. § 2590.715-
2719 (2016); see also How Do I Appeal a Health Plan Decision?, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/how-do-i-appeal-a-health-insurance-companys-decision/ (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2016) (guidance on appealing health care determinations). 
299. 26 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719 (2015); Complaint at 83, UnitedHealth Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 
527. 
300. How Do I Appeal a Health Plan Decision?, supra note 298. 
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reviewer overturns the insurer’s denial, the insurer must give the enrollee 
payments or services requested in the enrollee’s claim.301 
If an appeal is unsuccessful, the enrollee can then either file a lawsuit 
or a complaint.  Individuals with employee benefit plans302 should bring 
suits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) to 
challenge a denial of benefits that violates the ACA.303  ERISA governs 
almost all health benefits plans offered through private employers, and 
ERISA preempts state law.304  Under ERISA, plan participants and 
beneficiaries can bring a case “to recover benefits due to [them] under the 
terms of [their plans], to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the 
plan[s], or to clarify [their] rights to future benefits under the terms of the 
plan[s].”305  By bringing a claim to enforce employee benefit rights, the 
enrollee can challenge a wide range of noncompliant plan design features 
that can be addressed prospectively, without awaiting denial of a health 
service.306 
For private plans that ERISA may not govern, the enrollee may be able 
to bring a lawsuit for state causes of action (e.g., violations of unfair trade 
practice laws) after exhausting the plan’s appeals process.  For systematic 
denials, plaintiffs can ban together and file a class action.307  
Alternatively, parties can file complaints with their state insurance 
commissioner or attorney general, depending on the authority granted to 
each party under state laws and regulations. 
Medicaid recipients may also need to first exhaust the Medicaid plan’s 
appeals process.308  A recipient may request to continue to receive 
 
301. Appealing Health Plan Decisions, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/appeal/appealing-health-plan-decisions.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2017). 
302. ERISA employee benefit plans include all private sector employee benefit plans except for 
church plans; plans in which the sole purpose is to comply with workers’ compensation, 
unemployment, or disability insurance laws; plans maintained outside of the United States 
primarily for the benefit of non-United States residents; or excess benefit plans.  Additionally, 
ERISA does not cover governmental plans.  29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)-(b) (2015). 
303. Id. § 1132(a); see Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., 305 F.R.D. 115, 130–31 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (providing an example of a plaintiff bringing a claim pursuant to section 502 of the ERISA 
for federal parity violations). 
304. THE CAL. PATIENT’S GUIDE, YOUR RIGHTS TO APPEAL AND LITIGATE BENEFIT DENIALS 
UNDER ERISA 50 (2002). 
305. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2015); Ellen Weber, Equity Standards for Health Insurance 
Coverage: Will the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 179, 225 (2013). 
306. Weber, supra note 305, at 225. 
307. See NB ex rel. Peacock v. D.C., 682 F.3d 77, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing a class 
action medical denial suit). 
308. Many states have an exhaustion requirement before a Medicaid recipient may request a 
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coverage during the appeals process, but may be required to repay the 
cost of such services if an adverse determination is given.309  If the appeal 
has been unsuccessful, the participant has a right to a fair hearing through 
the state regardless of whether the recipient obtains benefits through a 
fee-for-service system or a managed care organization.310  The state 
Medicaid agency must provide the recipient with written notice of appeal 
rights when it denies coverage.  The State will try the case de novo.311  If 
the State overturns the Medicaid administrator’s decision, the agency 
must promptly make corrective payments, retroactive to the date that the 
incorrect action was taken, and, if appropriate, provide for admission or 
readmission of an individual to a facility.312 
B.  Passing State Consumer Protection Legislation 
Legislation, when thoughtfully drafted, is an effective way to mitigate 
unfair, burdensome, and discriminatory insurance practices.  This Part 
discusses examples of recent consumer protection legislation aimed at 
these practices, while highlighting key provisions of effective bills. 
1.  Step Therapy 
As of July 2016, at least fifteen states enacted legislation to address 
step therapy policies.313  An effective step therapy bill should include 
provisions such as a clinical review criteria requirement;314 a step therapy 
override determination process, which would allow an enrollee or 
provider to request that a step therapy protocol not apply in certain 
situations; time limits for insurers to respond to override requests; and a 
requirement that enrollees do not have complete any particular step more 
than once. 
Lawmakers in Ohio introduced an effective step therapy bill in 
 
state fair hearing.  Navigating Medicare and Medicaid: Medicaid—Online Version, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Feb. 11, 2005), http://kff.org/other/navigating-medicare-and-medicaid-medicaid-online-
version/. 
309. KY. PROT. & ADVOCACY, MEDICAID DENIED MY REQUEST FOR SERVICES, NOW WHAT? 
15 (2010). 
310. 42 C.F.R. § 431.205 (2016); 42 C.F.R. § 431.220 (2016). 
311. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244 (2016). 
312. Id. § 431.246. 
313. Step Therapy, COALITION ST. RHEUMATOLOGY ORGS., http://www.csro.info/failfirst (last 
visited May 8, 2017). 
314. “Clinical review criteria” means “written screening procedures, decision abstracts, clinical 
protocols, and clinical practice guidelines used by a health plan issuer or utilization review 
organization to determine the medical necessity and appropriateness of health care services.”  S.B. 
243, 131st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016). 
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2015.315  The bill requires every insurer or utilization review organization 
implementing a step therapy protocol to use clinical review criteria.  An 
independent panel of experts must develop the clinical review criteria 
based on high-quality research and create a transparent process to ensure 
that all steps are evidence based and consistent with medical standards of 
care.316  Furthermore, the bill provides for a step therapy exemption 
determination, which allows a provider to override an insurer’s step 
therapy protocols if the provider finds that: 
 The medication is contraindicated, would likely cause an adverse 
reaction, or would likely result in harm to the enrollee; 
 the medication is likely to be ineffective for the enrollee; 
 the enrollee has already tried the requested medication under the 
current or previous insurance plan and it was ineffective; 
 the medication required by the insurer is not in the best interest 
of the enrollee or medically appropriate; or 
 the enrollee is stable on a particular medication currently selected 
by the health care provider.317 
Strong step therapy legislation, such as the Ohio bill, can help protect 
consumers, prevent loopholes, and ensure that all step therapy decisions 
are rooted in science and medicine. 
2.  Adverse Tiering 
Several states have also introduced legislation aimed at limiting 
specialty tiers.  Both Oregon and Illinois have introduced bills with 
effective provisions.  For example, Oregon introduced a bill in 2015 that 
prohibits insurers from placing all drugs within a therapeutic or 
pharmacological class in the cost tier with the highest out-of-pocket 
costs.318  Similarly, in 2015, Illinois introduced legislation that allows 
enrollees to request an exception to the tiered cost-sharing structure so 
that an insurer would have to cover nonpreferred medications under the 
same cost-sharing structure as preferred drugs.319  An enrollee could 
request the exception if the enrollee’s prescriber determines that the 
preferred drug for treatment of the same condition would either be 
ineffective for the individual, result in an adverse effect, or both.320 
Strong legislation in this area should also include the following 
provisions: 
 
315. S.B. 243, 131st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016). 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. H.B. 2951, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015). 
319. H.B. 3605, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015–2016). 
320. Id. 
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 A requirement that copayments and coinsurance apply to a single 
deductible that includes both prescription medications and health 
care services; 
 a requirement that placement of prescription medications on a 
specific tier is based on clinical review criteria developed through 
a transparent process by an independent commission of experts 
to provide access; and 
 a streamlined review and appeals process for adverse prior 
authorization determinations, providing an expedited process for 
urgent care services. 
Some state legislation also includes caps on prescription copayments 
or coinsurance.321  These caps range from $100 per month to $3,500 per 
year.322  This type of protection need not be reserved to lawmakers; other 
state agencies could ensure caps as well.  For example, in 2015, the board 
of California’s health insurance exchange agreed to impose a cap on cost 
sharing for high-priced specialty drugs on state-run exchange plans.323  
The cap for most enrollees on California’s exchange is now set at $250 
per prescription per month.324  Under the prior system, enrollees had to 
pay costs up to their plan deductible, which could amount to thousands 
of dollars per month.  Strong legislation and rules for state exchanges that 
address specialty tiers provide enrollees with better access to care.  These 
rules also prevent and restrict insurers from limiting access on the basis 
of a medical condition or disability. 
3.  Nonmedical Switching 
Effective state legislation can curb nonmedical switching and allow 
stable enrollees with chronic or rare conditions to maintain their current, 
effective medication regimens.  For example, in 2016, Florida lawmakers 
introduced a bill that prohibits pharmacy benefit managers, individual 
 
321. Sabrina Corlette et al., State Efforts to Reduce Consumers’ Cost-Sharing for Prescription 
Drugs, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 16, 2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2015/nov/state-efforts-to-reduce-
consumers-cost-sharing-for-prescription-drugs. 
322. Michael Ollove, States Limiting Patient Costs for High-Priced Drugs, PEW CHARITABLE 
TR. (July 2, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/07/02/states-limiting-patient-costs-for-high-priced-drugs.  
323. Peter Sullivan, Calif. ObamaCare Exchange Caps Patient Drug Costs, HILL (May 22, 
2015, 1:13 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/242951-calif-obamacare-exchange-caps-
patient-drug-costs. 
324. Chad Terhune, Obamacare: California Exchange Caps Specialty Drug Costs for Patients, 
L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/healthcare/la-fi-
obamacare-specialty-drug-costs-20150522-story.html.  Bronze-level plans have a monthly cap of 
$500, after a $500 pharmacy deductible is met.  Id. 
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and group insurers, and HMOs from limiting or excluding coverage for a 
drug for individuals with complex, chronic, or rare conditions if (1) the 
drug was previously approved for coverage by the insurer; (2) the 
prescriber continued to prescribe the drug; and (3) the drug is 
appropriately prescribed and is considered safe and effective for treating 
a medical condition.325  The bill also prohibits insurers from placing 
limitations on the maximum coverage of prescription drug benefits, 
increasing out-of-pocket costs for the drug, and moving the drug to a 
higher tier after the plan year has begun.326 
Strong legislation should also require insurers to provide adequate and 
advance notice to an enrollee if the insurer decides, during the annual 
renewal period, to no longer cover a prescription medication or move it 
to a different formulary tier.  To protect enrollees from year to year, 
effective legislation should also include a provision that requires the 
insurer to continue such coverage for grandfathered plans.  A 
comprehensive nonmedical switching bill that incorporates these 
provisions, as well as the provisions discussed above, can ensure 
uninterrupted, continuous care for enrollees who are stable on their 
medications. 
4.  Prior Authorizations 
To ensure that prior authorization policies are consistent with 
evidence-based standards of care and do not result in undue delays or 
denials of care, several states have introduced bills that govern the prior 
authorization process.327  For example, West Virginia introduced a bill in 
2016 that requires insurers to accept universal prior authorization forms, 
permit electronic submission of prior authorization forms, respond to 
authorization requests within certain deadlines, and recognize approved 
requests as valid for no less than one year.328 
Strong legislation should also standardize prior authorization 
requirements and criteria across all plans by seeking to create a uniform 
prior authorization form, urging the creation of an electronic submission 
process, and requiring insurers to meet deadlines when responding to a 
request to cut down on wait times.  It should also include a requirement 
that prior authorization be valid for the entirety of the enrollee’s 
 
325. S.B. 1142, 2016–2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. 89 (Fla. 2016). 
326. Id. 
327. See, e.g., S.B. 273, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (imposing deadlines and requiring 
universal authorization forms); H.B. 1608, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2016) (amending 
prescription drug authorization procedures); H.B. 3605, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015–
2016) (requiring insurers to state reasons for denying coverage). 
328. S.B. 273, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016). 
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eligibility period, inclusive of any renewal period (i.e., grandfathered 
plans); a presumption of approval for coverage of a limited supply of 
medication in certain defined cases where a delay in approval would 
jeopardize an enrollee’s health; defined response deadlines, including 
expedited response times for urgent care services; and a streamlined 
appeals process for adverse prior authorization determinations.  By 
preventing insurers from implementing overly burdensome prior 
authorization policies, these laws can help reduce undue delays of quality 
care. 
5.  Network Adequacy 
States have also enacted network adequacy laws or introduced 
legislation to protect from surprise medical bills and ensure that 
individuals have access to providers.329  For example, Kentucky law 
requires managed care plans to “arrange for a sufficient number and type 
of primary care providers and specialists throughout the plan’s service 
area to meet the needs of enrollees.”330  The law includes many of the 
key components of a strong network adequacy bill including 
requirements that: a network contain a sufficient number of providers, 
providers be accessible in each geographic location, information be 
accurate and easily accessible, and a system be in place to report 
inaccurate information and ensure such inaccuracies are corrected within 
a reasonable timeframe.  These provisions are intended to provide all 
enrollees, regardless of geographic location, with accessible care without 
unreasonable burden or delay. 
6.  Clinical Pathways 
Some states have introduced legislation designed to prevent insurers 
from providing improper incentives to health care providers.  For 
example, Nevada introduced legislation in 2015 that would require 
insurers to disclose to all enrollees any incentive offered to a health care 
provider to encourage the prescribing of certain medications, as well as 
any compensation program designed to encourage a provider to withhold 
treatment.331 
In May 2016, California introduced a bill aimed specifically at clinical 
pathways to “ensure transparency and accountability when health plans 
 
329. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-515 (2016) (imposing requirements for 
managed care in Kentucky); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/13.20(b) (2016) (imposing requirements for 
managed care in Illinois). 
330. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-515 (2016). 
331. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015). 
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develop and implement clinical care pathways.”332  The bill required 
plans to ensure that clinical pathways are developed in accordance with 
specified procedures, and it prohibited plans from developing and 
implementing pathways that discouraged patient access to clinical 
trials.333  While the bill is a step in the right direction, strong legislation 
should also improve transparency and prohibit improper incentive 
systems, such as the bill introduced in Nevada. 
Many states—including California, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and 
Vermont—prohibit or limit gifts from pharmaceutical or medical device 
manufacturing companies to health care providers.334  For example, 
Minnesota prohibits “any manufacturer or wholesale drug distributor, or 
any agent thereof, to offer or give any gift of value to a practitioner.”335  
States should consider amending these laws by extending their reach to 
apply to insurers as well. 
C.  Strong Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws 
Insurers must be held accountable for unfair, deceptive, and 
discriminatory practices.  Proper enforcement of current laws and new 
regulations can serve as a meaningful incentive for insurers to create 
policies that are fair and transparent, thereby improving access to quality 
health care for enrollees.  Strong oversight and enforcement measures by 
regulators of current consumer-protection laws can effectively achieve 
this goal.  Additionally, states with diluted consumer protection laws or 
UDPT laws must enact stronger laws that protect its consumers against 
predatory and unscrupulous business practices. 
The effectiveness of consumer protection laws and regulations, 
including the new legislation dealing with specific benefit utilization 
management policies discussed in the previous Part, vary widely from 
state to state.336  Many states have placed legal obstacles in the path of 
officials charged with the enforcement of these consumer protection laws, 
or imposed ceilings as low as $1,000 on civil penalties, effectively 
making consumer protection laws meaningless because they cannot be 
properly enforced.337  For example, states such as Alabama, Delaware, 
Florida, and New Hampshire exempt insurers completely from the state 
 
332. A.B. 2209, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
333. Id. 
334. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 119400, 119402 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. § 151.461 
(2016); 105 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 970.000–970.011 (2013); 18 VT. STAT. ANN., § 4631a (2015). 
335. MINN. STAT. § 151.461 (2016). 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
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consumer protection laws; and other states such as Colorado, Indiana, 
Nevada, North Dakota, and Wyoming impede the attorney general’s 
ability to stop ongoing unfair or deceptive practices by conditioning relief 
upon proof that unfair or deceptive practices were done knowingly or 
intentionally.338 
While states face the challenge of managing tight budgets and 
allocating limited resources, they should recognize the importance of 
consumer protection in this area and empower insurance commissioners 
and attorneys general to aggressively monitor claims of unfair, deceptive, 
and discriminatory practices.  Aggressive monitoring alone is not enough, 
however.  Regulators must take a strong response to well-founded claims 
against insurers, beginning with the completion of a thorough 
investigation, and following up by pursuing equitable, monetary, and, if 
appropriate, criminal penalties against insurers who violate state or 
federal laws and regulations substantial enough to serve as a deterrent for 
wrongdoing. 
Additionally, states with weak consumer protection laws must amend 
their statutes so that insurance companies must abide by the same 
consumer protection laws as other businesses and are not given special 
immunity, and attorneys’ general are not impeded from enforcing 
consumer protection laws currently in place. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of unfair, burdensome, and discriminatory utilization 
management practices continues to grow in the United States.  These 
practices put Americans at risk of receiving inferior treatments and 
paying prohibitively higher costs.  For those who cannot afford the added 
expense, they have no choice but to forgo treatment or ration their care.  
These practices are in direct violation of many federal and state laws that 
were passed to protect access to treatment.  Consumers, regardless of 
their health condition, deserve access to timely and quality treatment, as 
determined by their providers.  Therefore, consumers must be 
empowered to sue under current laws, policymakers must pass stronger 
consumer protection laws, and regulators must enforce existing 
protections once they are provided with adequate authority to do so. 
 
338. ALA. CODE § 8-19-7(3) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(b) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 
501.212(4) (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:3(I) (2017); CARTER, supra note 93, at 3. 
